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EXPLORING NORAMLIZATION OF DEVIANCE AND EXAMINING FACTORS 
THAT PREDICT CULTURE OF SAFETY IN THE OPERATING ROOM 
M. Imelda Wright 
October 31, 2019 
Patient safety in the operating room is a prodigious responsibility of OR nurses as 
the OR environment is complex and laden with risk, which increases surgical patients’ 
risk for adverse events. The dissertation presents the topic of patient safety in the 
operating room (OR), the concept of normalization of deviance, and a mixed-methods 
study with an exploratory sequential design that involved three phases. 
The dissertation comprises of five chapters. Chapter One presents an introductory 
overview of the salience of patient safety as well as its relevance to the unique 
environment of the OR. Chapter Two presents a concept analysis of normalization of 
deviance, which may be defined as the adoption of substandard practices, which typically 
occurs after a period of absence of adverse events.  Chapter Three presents Phase 1, 
which is the qualitative study that sought to examine primary OR safety concerns, 
explore the occurrence of normalization of deviance, and examine barriers and facilitators 
to the adherence to safety standards. Ten interviews with OR nurses were conducted.  
Chapter Four presents Phase 2, which is the quantitative study that sought to examine the 
strength and association of relationships between the length of OR nurse experience, OR 
nurse  engagement and OR culture of safety . Data were collected from 96 OR nurses 
from an online platform. Chapter Five presents Phase 3 of the study that synthesized the
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findings of engagement, and OR culture of safety. Data were collected from 96 OR 
nurses from an online platform. Chapter Five presents Phase 3 of the study that 
synthesized the findings of both the previous phases.   
The study findings demonstrate that normalization of deviance occurs in the OR. 
Barriers to adherences to safety standards and reasons for normalization of deviance 
include productivity pressure, complacency related to length of experience, social 
pressures, generalized complacency, and negative acculturation. Facilitators to the 
adherence to safety standards and protective factors against normalization of deviance 
include OR nurse engagement and supportive managerial relationships with OR nurses. 
In addition, OR nurse engagement was a significant predictor of OR culture of safety.  
It is imperative to acknowledge and mitigate barriers to the adherence to patient 
safety. It is also necessary to promote and encourage facilitators to the adherence to 
safety standards, such as OR nurse engagement and supportive managerial relationships 
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        INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to present a mixed methods, exploratory 
sequential design study that explored safety-related practices in the Operating Room 
(OR) with a particular focus on normalization of deviance, and to examine factors that 
predict culture of safety in the OR, specifically, length of OR nurse experience and OR 
nurse work engagement. An introduction, three manuscripts, one of which provides an in-
depth exploration of the concept of normalization of deviance, and a conclusion chapter, 
which synthesizes the findings, comprise the dissertation.  
Patient safety is a foundation of providing healthcare and has been compared to 
the provision of biological, physiological, and safety needs from the Maslow’s Hierarchy 
of Needs model (Maslow, 1954; Ulrich & Kear, 2014). Therefore, prioritizing the 
provision of patient safety within healthcare deserves sustained attention. However, there 
has been evidence that healthcare has fallen short of its responsibilities in this arena. For 
example, according to the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 1999 report To Err Is Human: 
Building a Safer Health System, adverse events occurred in up to 3.7% of annual 
admissions, and 13.6 % of these events led to patient mortality. The 1999 IOM report 
stated that errors within the healthcare industry were responsible for approximately 
44,000 to 98,000 patient deaths in the United States annually (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000). The report was an impetus that prompted healthcare systems to 
examine their personnel’s safety-related behavior (King, 2010; Kohn et al., 2000). As a
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 result of the concerning report, many healthcare facilities made strides to improve safety 
behaviors. For example, efforts were made to improve teamwork and to introduce 
transparent reporting of errors in a non-punitive manner (Espin, Lingard, Baker, & 
Regehr, 2006). Despite significant endeavors to improve safety behaviors in healthcare 
organizations, medical errors persist, generating substantial personal and monetary cost 
(IOM, 2006). Vincent and Amalberti (2015) asserted that despite continued efforts to 
fortify safety, challenges persist, mainly because safety in healthcare tends to be like a 
“moving target” (p. 539) due to continued medical innovations that change the shape of 
how care is provided.     
Safety in the operating room (OR) holds specific salience because it is one of the 
most complicated, information-intensive environments within healthcare (Christian et al., 
2006; Wright, 2016; Link, 2019), and adverse events in the OR remain a substantial 
cause of mortality for surgical patients (Goldenberg & Elterman, 2019). It is therefore 
imperative to examine patterns of performance and factors that affect safety in the OR.  
Valuable insights on safety from other industries has been gleaned. For example, 
researchers who examined the causes of global catastrophes, such as the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) 
Challenger and Columbia Space Shuttle disasters, concluded that incidents like these are 
typically the result of many people breaking safety-related rules, a practice that appears 
innocuous on the surface.  After an exhaustive exploration of the NASA disasters, 
Vaughan (1996) coined the term “normalization of deviance.” The term placed a label on 
the phenomenon of gradually reducing safety standards to a new normal after a period of 
absence from negative outcomes. She concluded that the absence of negative outcomes 
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tended to reinforce the behaviors associated with cutting corners, bypassing safety 
checklists, and ignoring alarms (Vaughan, 1996). This practice is specifically concerning 
in the OR arena as patient safety is heavily dependent on perioperative teams who adhere 
to safety standards. 
Chapter two of the dissertation presents a concept analysis on normalization of 
deviance. Walker and Avant's (2019) concept analysis procedure was applied to organize 
the framework. The steps include the introduction of the concept, presenting the purposes 
of the analysis, outlining the uses of the concept, discussing the defining attributes, 
presenting cases related to the concept that include, a model case, a related case, and 
contrary case,  identifying antecedents and consequences, and defining empirical 
referents (Walker and Avant, 2019).  
Chapter three outlines the qualitative study that explored safety–related practices 
in the OR. The specific aims of the study included to: identify the primary safety 
concerns of OR nurses; explore the concept of normalization of deviance in the OR; and 
examine barriers and facilitators to the adherence to safety standards. The participants for 
the study included 10 OR nurses from the Louisville, Kentucky metropolitan area. The 
primary safety concerns that OR nurses reported were as follows: productivity pressures 
and  inadequate staff to support workload.  The qualitative interviews provided rich data, 
which illustrated the presence of normalization of deviance in the OR. Five themes 
emerged from the data that pointed to barriers to the adherence to safety standards and 
reasons for normalization of deviance in the OR, which included productivity pressures, 
generalized complacency, complacency related to length of experience, social pressures, 
and negative acculturation. Facilitators to the adherence to safety standards and protective 
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factors against normalization of deviance included OR nurse engagement and supportive 
managerial relationships with OR nurses.  
While examining barriers and facilitators to the adherence to safety standards, 
there was a particular focus placed on the length of OR nurse experience and OR nurse 
engagement. Length of experience and engagement and their association with safety are 
illustrated in Benner’s (1984) Novice to Expert model, which explains how clinical 
experience leads to knowledge, engagement, and sound decision-making consistent with 
safety. Furthermore, it has been touted that the length of time that nurses remain in their 
roles is valuable because the knowledge and experience that is acquired cumulatively is a 
key component to quality care and overall safety for patients (Benner, 1984; Riley, 
Dearmon, Mestas, & Buckner, 2016). In contrast, however to previous studies associating 
length of experience with safety, the concept of normalization of deviance suggests that 
deviations from standards occur over time, which is an indication that length of 
experience may be an encumbrance to safety practices.   
The qualitative study findings demonstrated that while OR nurse experience can 
be linked to complacency, which can be antecedent to normalization of deviance, OR 
nurse engagement was touted to be a facilitator to the adherence to safety standards and a 
protective factor against normalization of deviance. In addition, supportive managerial 
relationships with OR nurses was deemed as a facilitator to the adherence to safety 
standards.  
Chapter four outlines the quantitative study that aimed to examine the strength 
and association of relationships between the length of OR nurse experience, OR nurse 
engagement, and OR culture of safety. This chapter presents an overview on the culture 
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of safety, which is reflected by the internalized values and behaviors of employees 
(Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009). A culture of safety is critical to thwart 
errors in the OR, and therefore, it is imperative to examine the factors that support a 
culture of safety and those that may attenuate it. The findings of the study indicated that 
OR nurse engagement had a strong, statistically significant relationship with OR culture 
of safety, and it was a significant predictor of OR culture of safety. In contrast, the 
relationship between OR nurse length of experience and OR culture of safety was not 
statistically significant. 
Chapter five provides a synthesis of findings from both chapters three and four to 
present the mixed-methods, exploratory sequential design of the research. This chapter 
illustrates how two methods of research optimize the knowledge acquisition in the field 
of OR patient safety. For example, while social sciences have typically measured culture 
of safety by examining individual attitudes towards safety, other sciences, such as 
engineering, have traditionally assessed safety with a focus on the examination of 
systems (Pidgeon, 1998). Therefore, the combination of more than one approach to 
exploring OR safety was apt, whereby specific safety practices and systematic influences 
were explored within the tapestry of safety culture by using a mixed-methods, 
exploratory sequential design. Chapter five illustrates how the synthesized study results  
adds to the body of nursing knowledge, and implications for further research, practice 
implications, and policy were described.  
In summary, OR nurses have patient safety concerns, normalization of deviance 
exists in the OR, and reasons for its occurrence include productivity pressure, generalized 
complacency, complacency related to length of experience, social pressures,  and 
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negative acculturation. Facilitators to the adherence to safety standards included OR 
nurse engagement and supportive managerial relationships with OR nurses.  
 It is crucial to disseminate the finding of this mixed-methods study so that 
normalization of deviance can be acknowledged as a prominent threat to OR patient 
safety. It is also essential to uncover the reasons why this occurs in ORs so that the 
problems existing in ORs can be addressed and mitigated. The results highlight the 
pertinence of OR nurse engagement and its role in mitigating risk in the OR. It is 
therefore critical to identify strategies to foster and sustain engagement in OR nurses.  
Finally, as evidence showed that supportive managerial relationships with OR nurses is a 
facilitator to the adherence to safety standards, efforts should be made to foster 








    CHAPTER II 
CONCEPT ANALYSIS: NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE 
Introduction and Significance 
The term normalization of deviance was coined by Dr. Diane Vaughan, a 
prominent sociologist, who defined it as a phenomenon in which individuals and teams 
deviate from what is known to be an acceptable performance standard until the adopted 
way of practice becomes the new norm (Vaughan, 1996). The concept gained traction 
after Vaughan did an exhaustive exploration of the relationship structures and incidents 
within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that led to the 
disasters associated with both the Challenger and the Columbia space shuttles. For 
example, on January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds 
following the launch, which killed all seven crewmembers. The path of the shuttle’s 
demise began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster failed at the shuttle 
launch. Its failure led to a rupture in the joint, which allowed pressurized burning gas 
from within the motor to dissipate. The cascade of events caused the separation and 
structural collapse of the external tank, essentially concluding with the shuttle blowing 
apart in a catastrophic manner. The relationship between normalization of deviance and 
the disaster lies within the realization that while the disaster itself was unanticipated, the 
problem that initiated the tragic cascade was not unknown (Gerstle, 2018).  
Vaughan (1996) identified the phenomenon of gradually reducing safety 
standards to a new normal after a period of absence from negative outcomes, suggesting
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that the absence of negative outcomes tended to reinforce the behaviors associated with 
cutting corners, bypassing safety checklists, and ignoring alarms. In her book, The 
Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, 
Vaughan specifically investigated the behavior of personnel leading up to the Challenger 
Space Shuttle disaster in 1986, and she illustrated how NASA personnel gradually 
tolerated anomalies and structural abnormalities within spacecraft joints. One of the 
primary contributors to the sense of comfort with danger was that there had been 
successful flights even when spacecraft joints were not sealing as they had been intended, 
which lulled NASA personnel into a false sense of security.  
The concept aligns within Rasmussen’s (1997) theory of migration to boundaries, 
which illustrated how front-line employees attempt to carry out work-related tasks with 
efficiency and productivity. Rasmussen explained that pressures on employees encourage 
adaptation to the environment, which may mean migrating to the boundaries of what is 
considered to be safe practice.  
A prolific interest in organizational safety was generated in the 1990s, which was 
in part due to a culmination of well-publicized global disasters that occurred in the late 
1980s, such as NASA’s Challenger explosion, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill, and the London King’s Cross Underground fire (Pidgeon, 1998).  The 
exploration of global disasters has led researchers to conclude that system failures arise 
from a significant period of inattention to detail and a normalization of deviance 
(Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008; Pidgeon, 1998; Vaughan, 1996). Furthermore, it has been 
gleaned that  disasters are typically the result of many people breaking safety-related 
rules, a practice that appears banal on the surface (Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008).  
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Although the origins of the normalization of deviance concept arose within 
investigations into the safety practices of NASA (Vaughan, 1996), it has been determined 
that it has a ubiquitous presence in healthcare (Banja, 2010; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017; 
Gerstle, 2018). In healthcare, deviation from sound safety practices may offer perceived 
advantages, such as efficiency from a time standpoint (Reid, 2014; Harvey & Sotardi, 
2017); some healthcare personnel speciously accept that deviations offer a path to 
increased productivity. Unfortunately, over time, short cuts are prone to becoming the 
cultural norm (Gerstle, 2018). This phenomenon unhinges the safety culture within an 
organization by gradually tolerating lower safety standards, which increases 
organizations’ vulnerability to errors and adverse patient outcomes (Prielipp, Magro, 
Morell, & Brull, 2010; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017).  
  Normalization of deviance is particularly concerning in the operating room (OR) 
because, it is a complex, information-intensive, multi-faceted, fast-paced environment 
that has been described as hazardous for patients (Link, 2019) and deviating from safety 
standards can greatly increase surgical patients’ risk for adverse events. According to 
Goldenberg and Elterman (2019), adverse events in the OR continue to remain a 
prevalent cause of mortality.  
Purpose  
The purpose of the analysis was to explore the concept of normalization of 
deviance, and the role it plays within the behavior of personnel in high-risk, healthcare 
environments, such as the OR. It is important to identify, expose, and acknowledge the 
phenomenon within high-risk healthcare environments. Gaining a better understanding of 
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the concept opens doors to learning how to thwart its harmful consequences (Harvey & 
Sotardi, 2017).   
Analyzing the concept is also helpful to realize that there is something much more 
powerful at play than people who make mistakes in the workplace. A close analysis of 
examples where normalization of deviance occurred showed that people generally do not 
have intentions to be risky (Banja, 2010); rather, they are in situations where 
organizational pressures, such as time commitments and productivity pressures, push 
personnel to migrate past the boundaries of what is deemed to be safe (Amalberti et al, 
2006; Price & Williams, 2018).  It is important for healthcare organizations to be 
cognizant of the phenomenon of normalization of deviance so that front-line personnel 
and leaders can be observant, intervene where there are indications that it is happening, 
and seek ways to impede its progression within organizations.  
Although normalization of deviance exists in healthcare (Amalberti et al, 2006; 
Price & Williams, 2018; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017), there is a dearth of literature relating 
to its exact nature. One of the reasons cited is that while healthcare is submerged in rules 
and regulations, there is typically extra space for clinical judgement, and so it is difficult 
to define when a violation has actually occurred. In addition, due to the ubiquitous 
guidelines and recommendations, rigid adherence is uncommon, and these guidelines and 
standards are perceived more as recommendations than strict standards (Harvey & 
Sotardi, 2017). Amalberti et al. (2006) averred that despite deviations being a serious 
threat to patient safety, the deviations are inadequately studied, and they concluded that 
the absence of adequate data should not undermine the problem.  The danger of not 
exposing this phenomenon is that patient adverse events are likely to result when the 
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breaching of safety standards go under-acknowledged over an extended period (Banja, 
2010; Price & Williams, 2018; Amalberti, et al., 2006; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017). 
Uses of the concept ‘Normalization of Deviance’ 
Understanding the concept of normalization of deviance within high-risk 
industries and acknowledging why personnel may deviate from safety standards 
illustrates how the stage may be set for major calamities to occur. According to Vaughn 
(1997), the relationship between policy decisions and errors is a prominent issue in all 
organizations, but in particular within organizations where there is potential for loss of 
life. Vaughan (1997) reported that most organizations have strategies to reduce errors by 
focusing on the immediate situation in which the error occurred as well as the people 
immediately involved, and much less attention has traditionally been given to the 
organizational system and its environment. Lessons learned from the NASA disasters can 
help people in other high-risk organizations, such as healthcare, focus on safety practices. 
Patient safety has been a salient topic of conversation and literature for most of 
the past two decades. The 1999 IOM report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System reported that  as many as 98,000 patients die annually due to medical errors, 
which costs between 17 to 29 billion dollars (Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality 
of Health Care in, 2000). The sobering report was an impetus that has prompted 
healthcare systems to examine its personnel’s safety-related behavior (Institute of 
Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in, 2000; King, 2010). The IOM report 
has also triggered healthcare systems to examine cultures of safety overall as well as how 
personnel drift from safety practices. The OR, in particular, is a high-risk environment 
where deviation from safety standards may lead to serious adverse patient outcomes. 
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Although OR safety has been highlighted in the literature, and consequently many safety-
related policies have been embraced, safety violations in the OR environment continue to 
be a problem (Zahiri et al., 2011; Goldenberg & Elterman, 2019 ).  
The incidence of unintentional retained foreign objects are estimated to occur in 1 
in every 5,500 surgeries, and the outcomes for patients include reoperation, prolonged 
hospital stays, infection, obstruction, visceral perforation, and death (Steelman, Shaw, 
Shine, & Hardy-Fairbanks, 2019). Mehtsun et al. (2013) reported that based on available 
malpractice data, US ORs had close to 10,000 never-events in the period between 1990 
and 2010, and 6.6% of these events resulted in patient death. In addition, there was over 
$1.3 billion paid toward malpractice claims related to those events.  The researchers 
averred that these payments did not encompass the financial strain of legal fees, patient 
disability, lost work time, and defamation of the surgical team and facility involved. 
However, beyond the steep financial implications, working on solutions to prevent never 
events is required to prevent injury to patients. The researchers  concluded that the 
number of never-events was probably much higher that what was reported in the study 
due to the numerous never-events that do not result in malpractice claims as well as the 
limit on reporting systems to capture each event (Mehtsun et al., 2013).  
The Joint Commission required the use of the Universal Protocol in 2004, a 
process that mandated a carefully plotted process of patient and procedure identifications 
prior to surgery, the purpose of which was to increase patient safety standards by 
avoiding the occurrence of wrong site or wrong patient procedures. However, despite the 
best intentions, this adopted protocol did not meet its expected intentions; the 
standardized protocol has failed to prevent such events. Examination of the Universal 
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Protocol’s impediments concluded that general deviations from the intended protocol was 
a primary cause (Stahel, Mehler, Clarke, & Varnell, 2009). In addition, King (2010) 
reported that deviant behavior of personnel was a substantial cause of errors in the OR.  It 
is therefore critical to highlight the existence of normalization of deviance in the OR so 
that direct-care personnel and managers can acknowledge the phenomenon to assuage its 
progress and mitigate its consequences.  
Defining the Attributes of Normalization of Deviance 
According to Walker and Avant (2019), the defining attributes of a concept that 
are most commonly related the concept. A primary feature that is associated with 
normalization of deviance is productivity pressure (Price & Williams, 2018; Harvey & 
Sotardi, 2017). Productivity pressure may be defined as an increased emphasis on the 
quantity of services provided over the quality in the interest of the generation of revenue 
(Wilbanks et al., 2018). This pressure typically stems from managerial personnel and 
creates a barrier to the adherence to safety standards that may be time-consuming 
(Harvey & Sotardi, 2017).  
Healthcare personnel’s deviant behavior from safety practices does not stem from 
malicious intent (Banja, 2010; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017); deviant behavior is typically the 
result of a perceived need for rational and necessary steps to increase productivity. Due to 
productivity pressures that are applied to personnel in the work environment, 
rationalization of deviant behavior becomes perceived as legitimate and necessary 
(Banja, 2010; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017). Banja (2010) alluded that normalization of 
deviance can occur when administrators deliver strict rules and regulations to direct-care 
employees, while concurrently demanding a high level of productivity. The application of 
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this kind of pressure encourages front-line workers to take short cuts and use 
workarounds to get a task accomplished without all of the steps that some regulations 
demand. Some argue that complete adherence with all of the rules would never make it 
possible to achieve the productivity that is demanded of them (Banja, 2010). Productivity 
pressure is an example of an unseen complexity within an organization that make it 
difficult for personnel to always adhere to safety protocols (Reason, 1990), and therefore 
it is a barrier to safety.   
Productivity pressure is a dominant facet of working within the OR, specifically 
because ORs are primary generators of revenue for hospitals (Peters, White, & Mahal-
van Brenk, 2013; Rothstein & Raval, 2018). In the OR, deviations are supportive of 
short-term efficiencies and help perioperative personnel to maintain a busy schedule with 
the productivity pressures that are placed on them. The threat to patients becomes more 
apparent when violations are accepted over time and when personnel become blind to the 
associated risk. The concept is congruent with Rasmussen’s (1997) theory of migration to 
boundaries, which suggested that direct-care employees are pressured to work with 
distinct focus on efficiencies and productivity, and in an attempt to honor productivity, 
safety boundaries becomes blurred.   
Model ‘Normalization of Deviance’ Case 
Vaughan (1996) presented the classic case of normalization of deviance in her 
book The Challenger Launch Decision. Vaughan provided a deep analysis of how 
NASA’s space shuttle Challenger disaster occurred in 1986. According to Vaughan 
(1996), nine shuttles were launched successfully in 1985, the year prior to the Challenger 
disaster. Seven of these shuttles showed signs of erosion; two had damage beyond 
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anything NASA had seen before. After each of these flights, engineers at NASA raised 
concerns about O-ring erosion, which is deterioration of the rings designed to be situated 
between two or more parts during assembly of the shuttle to create a seal at the joining 
interfaces. Despite memos, presentations, and acknowledgement about the O-ring 
concerns, NASA flights continued as usual. Vaughan concluded that the concept of 
normalization of deviance explained how NASA initially accepted O-ring anomalies; 
NASA personnel succumbed to lower standards, and flying shuttles with damaged O-
rings became the new norm (Vaughan, 1996). By 1985, there had been evidence of O-
ring erosion in seven of the nine shuttle launches. The engineers who oversaw the 
launches recognized that there was potential for calamity, particularly during a launch 
months earlier when extensive O-ring damage was identified during a post-flight review. 
The January 1986 launch on that fateful day however was planned despite existing 
problems. The personnel were willing to take the risk because previous flights that had 
been deemed successful guided the perception that there were no inherent danger 
(Gerstle, 2018).  
Dr. Vaughan was also involved in the investigation of NASA’s Columbia disaster 
in February 2003, which was 17 years after the Challenger disaster, and discovered a 
similar sequence of events. The cause of this tragedy was a foam debris strike, which 
evidently had been occurring on shuttle flights prior to the disaster. As with the 1986 
incident, NASA personnel had again succumbed to normalization of deviance, during 
which they had been aware of foam debris strikes and had tolerated lower safety 
standards because they perceived the risk to be acceptable (Vaughan, 2006). 
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In the 2008 publication of Flirting with Disaster; Why Accidents are Rarely 
Accidental, Gerstein and Ellsberg concurred with Vaughan (1996) that normalization of 
deviance played a primary role in NASA’s disaster. The authors stated that knowingly 
accepting such high risk in this way is similar to Russian Roulette, an activity which 
carries enormous peril; they concluded that no matter how many times Russian Roulette 
is played, it is still never safe. Instead, however, NASA personnel increased their comfort 
level and confidence by focusing on previous successful ventures and had forgotten to be 
fearful. According to Gerstein and Ellsberg (2008), a better approach would have been to 
assess each occurrence of O-ring erosion as perilous and to demand a rigorous resolution 
to problems as they occurred. Undoubtedly, the extra time allocated into remedying 
anomalies would result in delays and cost, but with an added benefit of high reliability 
(Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008) .  
Gerstein and Ellsberg (2008) also articulated the details of the Ukrainian 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 when radioactivity 90 times greater than the Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima bombs was discharged into the atmosphere surrounding the nuclear plant 
site, and concentrated toxic and carcinogenic plume spewed into the densely populated 
region surrounding the Chernobyl nuclear plant site in northern Ukraine. According to 
Gerstein and Ellsberg (2008), there were well-known signs of deviant safety practices 
preceding the event; however, personnel chose to under-report and under-acknowledge 
short cuts. Essentially, the deviant practice had become normalized over time, and 
disaster struck (Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008). 
The lessons learned from global disasters can be aptly applied to healthcare 
because while there are not shuttles and nuclear power plants to manage in healthcare, 
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there are certain parallels in relation to managing risk (Gerstle, 2018). Banja (2010) 
concurred with Reason (1990) who stated that disaster in healthcare is almost certain 
when omissions remain unresolved or under-acknowledged for an extended period. 
Therefore, what may begin as a perceived innocuous  deviation from a safety practice 
will somehow become “normalized” over time due to the repetition of the deviation 
(Vaughan, 1996; Gerstle, 2018). Unfortunately, these deviations become engrained in the 
culture of the organization, which is a serious cause of the unhinging of a safety culture.  
Borderline, related, and contrary cases 
Odom-Forren (2011) examined how normalization of deviance existed within 
perianesthesia nursing. During her investigation, colleagues gave examples of when 
safety standards had been abandoned, or deviations from safety practices occurred.  
Although many of the responses that she received were standard cases of normalization 
of deviance, some responses alluded to borderline cases of the normalization of deviance. 
These examples illustrated how adverse patient events could occur due to violations in 
safety protocols and standards.  For example, an RN reported that she was admonished in 
her workplace because she would not administer fentanyl from an unlabeled syringe. 
Other colleagues reported that they were rushed in the preoperative arena and admitted 
that individualized patient care suffered as a result. A common theme was “we don’t have 
time for that” (Odom-Forren, 2011) in relation to adhering wholly to safety protocols that 
may have been perceived as inefficient or unnecessary. Odom-Forren (2011) described 
how each RN in the examples did not perceive that this one action would lead to any kind 
of harm for patients. However, she pointed out that as violations occur, nurses become 
desensitized to the potential implications, and it becomes easier to normalize substandard 
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ways of performing tasks while renouncing some key safety practice measures in its 
wake.   
A related case of normalization of deviance was found in an article studying the 
occurrence of patient harm and death due to the mix-up of enteral feeding systems and 
intravenous (IV) systems. Simmons et al. (2011) reported incidences that included 
accidental connections of tubes with feedings that were intended for enteral use to an IV 
system. The authors concluded that the accidental misconnections were primarily related 
to a “universal” connector that can be used for both systems (Simmons, Symes, Guenter, 
& Graves, 2011). Based on the case reviews, a redesign of the connectors was 
recommended so that enteral feeding connectors would only be compatible with enteral 
feeding, and IV connectors would only be compatible with IV systems to minimize or 
prevent mistakes. However, despite documented evidence that these connectors cause 
patient harm and death, there had been an unwillingness to change, and progress was 
sluggish to remedy the danger. Decisions relating to the tubing were made at an 
administrative level with a focus on productivity and without a clear sense of patient 
safety, and the universal connector production continued and were distributed for use 
(Simmons et al., 2011).  
Gerstein and Ellsberg (2008) illustrated an example of a related case of 
normalization of deviance when they reported details on  a highly publicized disaster that 
involved the one-time popular prescription medication Vioxx manufactured by the 
pharmaceutical giant Merck & Company. During the period between 1999 and 2004, this 
medication resulted in over 100,000 injuries or deaths, and although there were known 
risks associated with the medication but it remained on the market because of exorbitant 
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profits for the pharmaceutical company (Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008).  
An example of a case contrary to the normalization of deviance would include a 
situation where OR nurses take excessive measures to apply safety standards to their 
patients without a rational evidenced-based practice approach. In addition, actions would 
be taken without any regard for time, cost, and efficiencies.  This example would present 
a precarious platform on which safety measures would be provided to patients but it 
would be an unsustainable approach to care delivery.   
Antecedents and Consequences to Normalization of Deviance 
According to Walker and Avant (2019), an antecedent must be in place before the 
occurrence of the concept and is not the same as a defining attribute. A primary 
antecedent to normalization of deviance is a generalized complacency related to the 
absence of adverse events (Vaughan, 1996; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017; Price & Williams, 
2018). Vaughan (1996) suggested that the absence of negative outcomes leads personnel 
to perceive that adverse events will not happen, which tends to fortify behaviors 
associated with taking shortcuts and bypassing safety protocols in their entirety. 
Furthermore, there tends to be an insensitivity to a deviant practice whereby it no longer 
feels wrong (Vaughan, 1996; Price & Williams, 2018).    
There is also a sense of complacency when rules and standards are perceived as 
irrational and inefficient (Banja, 2010; Odom-Forren, 2011). Banja (2010) illustrated an 
example of a protocol aimed to prevent narcotic diversion that requires nurses to enter 
their passwords as an indication that they have witnessed the safe waste of an incomplete 
administration of the contents of a narcotic vial. However, as nurses are frequently rushed 
because of competing demands in the workplace, they may perceive that the task of 
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asking a colleague to enter a password in the automated medication dispenser as an 
inconvenience that hampers efficiency, especially in light of the relative infrequency of  
narcotic diversion. Thus, in an effort to increase efficiency, the may nurses share 
passwords so that they can enter each other’s passwords in the event that the automated 
system requires a second password. The nurses in this situation are reacting to what they 
see to be an inefficient use of their time, and they fail to see that the perceived avenue of 
efficiency widens the gap of vulnerability for OR nurses to misuse narcotics. Therefore, 
the deviant practice negates any benefits from the intended aim to avert narcotic 
diversion (Banja, 2010).  
The consequences of normalization of deviance and its association with disaster 
has been well documented (Banja, 2010; Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008; Vaughan, 1996). 
This concept is a common pitfall for all personnel within high-risk organizations. Collins 
et al. (2014) concluded that accidents are seldom the consequence of isolated errors made 
by individuals; rather, accidents occur as a result of many errors occurring within a 
flawed system. A common remedy for mistakes in the workplace consists of reprimand of 
the person who made the error, and the reemphasis of the rules or policies. Reid (2014) 
argued that many of the traditional approaches to addressing workplace errors are 
ineffective and asked rhetorically how can reasonable people be expected to stop carrying 
out their specific ways of practice if there are specific barriers to adhering to safety 
standards.   
 Collins et al. (2014) referred to the Swiss Cheese model from Reason (2000) as a 
metaphor to illustrate how organizations without several layers of defense are vulnerable 
to catastrophe. Reason (2000) suggested that humans tend to deviate and make errors, but 
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catastrophes can be avoided if organizational systems are layered with enough defenses 
to recognize deviations early and make modifications to thwart major ill effects. Price 
and Williams (2018) also applied the Swiss Cheese model in their explanation of how 
adverse patient events can occur as a consequence to repeated deviations over a period, 
and reported that that adverse events occur when several critical factors align, which 
represent the holes in Reason’s Swiss Cheese model.   
Empirical referents 
The last step in a concept analysis is the identification of empirical referents, 
which are categories that illustrate the occurrence of the concept (Walker & Avant, 
2019). While there is currently not an instrument to measure normalization of deviance, 
occurrences can be seen in practice or captured qualitatively.  
Deviations from safety protocols are visible in the workplace under many guises, 
and each carry various amounts of risk. McNamara (2011) presented reflections of 
normalization of deviance in the OR as she discussed how OR personnel deviate from 
well-known guidelines set in place by the AORN. For example, the standards to prevent 
surgical site infection are typically well known by OR personnel, yet deviations from the 
standards may be seen. Examples include: personnel may gown off the back table instead 
of gowning off a separate flat surface so that the sterile back table is not contaminated by 
the risk of touching it with non-sterile, ungloved hands; personnel may remove gloves 
and retrieve clean supplies without washing their hands; personnel may not supervise 
opened sterile supplies in an OR; or personnel may move a sterile table by grasping its 
edges below the level of the sterile field after they have scrubbed (McNamara, 2011). 
Other common areas of deviation include reusing a “single-use” device, failure to follow 
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each step of safety checklists, and inadequate training to complete a task (Reid, 2010).  
While each deviation may be perceived to be benign and innocuous, the 
cumulative effect of deviations reduce safety standards. OR personnel, have mistakenly 
accepted that negative events, such as surgical site infection, wrong-site surgery, or 
retained surgical items are the consequence of one person committing a single act of 
negligence. However, history has taught that the occurrence of adverse events typically 
are reflective of multiple people deviating from safety protocols over a period (Banja, 
2010). The tolerated mediocrity can set the stage for a perfect storm, where patients can 
be our casualties (Reid, 2014; Price & Williams, 2018).  
Summary    
Normalization of deviance has been described as the acceptance of lower 
standards due to a gradual acceptance of deviant behavior by personnel. NASA decided 
to fly space shuttles with what they deemed as acceptable risk, but which resulted in 
disaster on more than one occasion. Lessons learned from NASA and other global 
disasters are salient reminders of what can happen in healthcare, particularly in the OR, if 
personnel within the field deviate from safety standards.  
Vaughan (1996) averred that most disasters have had an “incubation period” of 
deviation that occur without acknowledgement. When deviations accumulate, overtime 
the culture is modified to accept these deviations as cultural norms. She also clarified that 
repetition of what seems to be trivial, and the banality of daily routine, disguises a 
cumulative danger that may only be fully acknowledged in hindsight.  
Deviation from rules become normalized if people who see them fail to intervene 
(Banja, 2010). In some situations, personnel may not be assertive enough to speak up or 
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they may feel powerless within an organization to intervene. Safety experts within the 
healthcare industry stated that undetected and underreported  errors thwart the 
recognition of threats to patient safety and impede the progress on learning how to assess 
and avoid errors  (Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care, 2000). 
Gerstein (2008) referred to a term “politics triumphing over safety,” where supervisors 
may not disclose some unsafe practices within a department to upper management in an 
attempt to look better to superiors.  
Because the normalization of deviance is inimical to high quality care and safety, 
oversight and monitoring should be ongoing within healthcare facilities. The optimal time 
to intervene in the normalization of deviance is as soon as it is recognized because 
allowing unsafe behavior to continue further corrodes an organization’s defense system 
(Banja, 2010). Lessons learned from catastrophes in the past have shown that 
normalization of deviance may be present for extended periods before any catastrophe 
emerges; however, the longer it happens, the more likely it is that catastrophe will 
uncover itself (Vaughan, 1996).   
 System administrators must acknowledge that organizations have potential for 
normalization of deviance. When patient adverse events occur due to the normalization of 
deviance, system administrators need to recognize the intricacies of the cause of the error, 
rather than placing the blame on the person on the front line of the error.  Deviance is a 
reflection of a flawed safety system that needs to mended (Price & Williams, 2015). It is 
imperative that the reasons for this phenomenon are explored within organizations so that 
it can be discussed openly and become transparent. Support should be given to direct-care 
nurses so that barriers can be removed to adhere to intended safety protocols.  For 
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example, unrealistic time pressures should not be placed on front-line employees, staffing 
ratios should be observed so that there are enough personnel to complete tasks safely and 





EXPLORING SAFETY-RELATED PRACTICES IN THE OPERATING ROOM (OR) 
Background 
Normalization of deviance is a phenomenon in which individuals and teams 
deviate from what is known to be an acceptable performance standard until the adopted 
way of practice becomes the new norm. In healthcare, deviation from sound safety 
practices may offer perceived advantages; some healthcare personnel fallaciously believe 
that deviations offer a path to increased productivity. Over time, however, this kind of 
deviance is susceptible to becoming a cultural norm. This phenomenon erodes the safety 
culture within an organization by gradually accepting lower safety standards, which 
increases organizations’ exposure to risk. It can be particularly concerning in 
complicated, high-risk work environments, such as the operating room (OR) arena.   
Method 
This qualitative study used a focused ethnography design in which a purposeful 
sample of OR nurses with maximum variation was interviewed. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to: 1) identify the main safety concerns in the OR 
from the perspective of practicing OR registered nurses; 2) explore the concept of 
normalization of deviance in the OR; and 3) identify perceived barriers and facilitators to 




Specific examples of normalization of deviance in the OR included: productivity 
pressures, generalized complacency, complacency related to length of experience, social 
pressures, and negative acculturation.  Facilitators to adhering to safety protocols 
included nurse engagement.        
Introduction 
Normalization of deviance is a phenomenon in which people and teams deviate 
from what are accepted as standard performance measures until the adopted way of 
performance becomes a new and accepted norm (Vaughan, 1996). The phenomenon may 
be pervasive within organizations because people within an organization become so 
insensitive to deviant practice that this type of practice is no longer perceived as “wrong.”  
Insensitivity to deviance typically occurs perfidiously and gradually because adverse 
events do not generally occur until there is an alignment of other critical factors (Price & 
Williams, 2018).  
The concept lies within Rasmussen’s (1997) theory of migration to boundaries, 
which illustrates how front-line employees attempt to carry out work-related tasks with 
efficiency and productivity. Rasmussen (1997) explained that pressures on employees 
encourage conformation to the environment, which may mean drifting to the boundaries 
of what is known to be safe practice. When the drift  becomes more frequent and 
accepted, it has potential to project outside the boundary of safe practice (Rasmussen, 
1997). Eventually this behavior may lead to adverse outcomes (Amalberti, Vincent, 
Auroy, & de Saint Maurice, 2006; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017; Price & Williams, 2018). 
Research on global errors and calamities, such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident and 
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National Aeronautical Space Administration’s (NASA) Challenger and Columbia Space 
Shuttle disasters, has concluded that catastrophe is typically the result of many people 
breaking safety-related rules, the behavior of which appears innocuous on the surface 
(Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008). Vaughan (1996) identified the concept of normalization of 
deviance when she initially investigated the NASA Challenger disaster. Her extensive 
work related to both the NASA Challenger and Columbia disasters has been shared 
amongst other organizations, and it has helped industries, such as healthcare, recognize 
normalization of deviation and its uncertain consequences.  
Although the origins of normalization of deviance concept arose within 
investigations into the safety practices of NASA (Vaughan, 1996), it has a pervasive 
presence within the healthcare industry (Banja, 2010; Harvey, 2017; Price & Williams, 
2018); however,  there is ambiguity relating to its precise nature (Amalberti et al. 2006).  
There is a perception that deviation from safety practices in healthcare offers efficiency 
and increased productivity (Reid, 2014; Price & Williams, 2018). Over time, however, 
deviations and short cuts are prone to normalization.  Normalization of deviance 
unhinges the safety culture by gradually tolerating mediocrity, and this increases 
organizations’ vulnerability to adverse events (Prielipp, Magro, Morell, & Brull, 2010; 
Banja, 2010).   
Normalization of deviance is particularly concerning in the Operating Room (OR) 
because, it is a complex, information-intensive, multi-faceted, fast-paced environment 
that has been described as hazardous for patients (Link, 2019). Deviating from standards 
of care can in this type of environment greatly increase surgical patients’ risk for adverse 
events. According to Goldenberg and Elterman (2019), adverse events in the OR continue 
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to remain a prevalent cause of mortality.  
The study aims were to: 1) identify the main safety concerns in the OR from the 
perspective of practicing OR registered nurses; 2) explore the concept of normalization of 
deviance in the OR; and 3) identify perceived barriers and facilitators to adhering to 
safety standards.  
Background and Significance 
The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 1999 report To Err Is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System, concluded that adverse events occur in up to 3.7% of annual admissions 
and 13.6 % of these events lead to patient mortality. The report further estimated that 
error within the healthcare industry was responsible for approximately 44,000 to 98,000 
patient deaths in the United States annually. The IOM concluded that errors within 
healthcare were not the result of incompetent people making mistakes; rather, the cause 
of  healthcare errors is multi-faceted (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). 
This report was an impetus that prompted healthcare systems to examine their 
personnel’s safety-related behavior (King, 2010; Kohn et al., 2000). As a result, many 
healthcare facilities made efforts to fortify safety-related processes, such as strengthening  
teamwork and introducing better reporting systems in a non-punitive manner (Espin, 
Lingard, Baker, & Regehr, 2006). Despite significant efforts by many health care 
organizations to improve safety behaviors, medical errors persisted, generating 
substantial personal and monetary cost (IOM, 2006). Vincent and Amalberti (2015) 
averred that safety within the healthcare system is unique to safety in other organizations 
because as medical innovation continues, more types of patient adverse events are seen as 
preventable, therefore, patient safety margins get wider, making safety in healthcare a 
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“moving target” (p. 539). In essence, there is a range of vulnerabilities within healthcare 
systems, and there are a myriad of contributors to errors. Therefore, ongoing efforts of 
identification and acknowledgement of patient adverse events (and antecedents to such) 
should continue to be a salient provocation in healthcare and play a role in guiding safety 
improvement strategies (Vincent, Carthey, Macrae, & Amalberti, 2017).  
Maintaining a safe environment for patients in the OR has specific relevance, 
particularly because the OR is an information-intensive environment with complicated 
technology managed by multi-disciplinary team members who carry out high-risk 
interventions (Jones & Durbridge, 2016). Despite efforts to mitigate risk and maintain a 
safe environment for patients, adverse events in the OR remain a substantial threat to 
surgical patients (Zahiri et al., 2011; Goldenberg & Elterman, 2019).  
The incidence of unintentional retained foreign objects are estimated to occur in 1 
in every 5,500 surgeries, and the outcomes for patients include reoperation, prolonged 
hospital stays, infection, obstruction, visceral perforation, and death (Steelman, Shaw, 
Shine, & Hardy-Fairbanks, 2019). Between 1990 and 2010, US hospitals had close to 
10,000 OR-related never-events, which are occurrences that include unintentional 
retained foreign objects, wrong-site/wrong-procedure/wrong-person surgeries; 6.6% of 
these never events resulted in patient death. (Mehtsun, Ibrahim, Diener-West, Pronovost, 
& Makary, 2013).  
 In an effort to avoid the occurrence of wrong site or wrong patient procedures, 
the Joint Commission required the use of the Universal Protocol in 2004, a process that 
mandated a carefully plotted process of patient and procedure identifications prior to 
surgery (The Joint Commission, 2004).  However, this adopted protocol did not meet its 
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expected intentions, and failed to prevent such events (Stahel, Mehler, Clarke, & Varnell, 
2009), which was primarily due to lack of OR personnel compliance (Stahel et al., 2009; 
Banschbach, 2009). Impediments to the Universal Protocol’s success included 
inconsistencies in site-marking procedures, discrepancies in education for staff, and 
general deviations from the intended protocol . King (2010) reported that deviation from 
safety protocols over a period that had become normalized was a primary reason OR for 
patient adverse events.  
 Exploration of examples of normalization of deviance showed that people 
generally do not intentionally engage in risky behavior (Banja, 2010; Price & Williams, 
2018). Rather, they are in situations where organizational pressures, such as time 
commitments and productivity pressures, push personnel to migrate past the boundaries 
of what is deemed to be safe (Rasmussen, 1997; Amalberti et al, 2006; Dekker, 2011; 
Price &Williams, 2018).  This factor holds particular relevance in the OR, which can be 
one of the most prominent sources of revenue to hospitals. The OR has been referred to 
as the “financial hub of any hospital” (Rothstein & Raval, 2018, p 79), sometimes 
accounting for 65% of hospital margins (Peters, Young, White, & Mahal-van Brenk, 
2013). Therefore, OR personnel may be more prone to migrating past boundaries of safe 
practice due to productivity pressures driven by substantial revenue generation.   
While historically, organizations generally focused on incident reports and 
investigative efforts to assess safety, there is wide acceptance that adding assessments 
that both anticipate safety risks and include human factors is needed in the future 
(Vincent, Carthey, Macrae & Amalberti, 2017). Therefore, assessing the occurrence of 
normalization of deviance and the reasons for its occurrence is highly warranted, 
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particularly in the OR. There has been a paucity of research exploring normalization of 
deviance in the OR. 
Pilot Study 
In December 2017, a pilot study conducted separately from this current study in 
was driven by a threefold purpose:  1) to examine the feasibility of the qualitative 
approach exploring safety concerns that OR nurses had; 2)to gain insight into the 
existence of normalization of deviance; and, 3) to explore reasons for its occurrence. The 
pilot study data, which was not include in this study, contributed helpful insights about 
re-structuring the study design as well as modifying the interview questions to better 
understand the barriers and facilitators regarding OR safety standard adherence (Wright, 
2018).   
Pilot study findings (N=10) confirmed the presence of normalization of deviance, 
and the exposed six themes underlying the occurrence of normalization of deviance 
included generalized complacency, productivity/time pressures, workplace incivility, 
infobesity, and variation in experience (Wright, 2018).  This current study was based on 
the pilot data collection and analysis. As a result, the purpose of the current study was 
modified to include the examination of primary safety concerns of OR nurses, to explore 
examples of normalization of deviance, and to examine barriers and facilitators to the 
adherence to safety standards. Interview questions were amended to include the role of 
specific nurse characteristics, such as length of OR nurse experience, nurse engagement, 
and nursing’s role in fortifying or assuaging safety-related practices (Wright, 2018). 
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Research Design and Methods 
This cross-sectional, qualitative study features a focused ethnographic design. 
Focused ethnography is a branch of traditional ethnography in which specific elements of 
a culture are examined against the backdrop of a larger more complex culture (Wolf, 
2010). According to Richards and Morse (2013), ethnography provides the researcher 
with an opportunity to describe cultural norms, perspectives, characteristics, behaviors, 
and patterns. The focused ethnographic design is appropriate for the exploration of a 
subcultural group rather than a cultural group (Richards & Morse, 2013). Thus, this 
design was apt to use to explore safety behaviors and normalization of deviance within 
the subculture of OR nurses. 
Sample 
Participants were purposely sampled based on their field-specific knowledge of 
OR nursing.  Because OR nursing is a nursing sub-culture with its own rules, knowledge, 
skill-set, and behaviors, purposive sampling is an appropriate technique for a focused 
ethnography. Specifically, maximum variation sampling was applied, the goal of which 
was to include OR nurses who practice at various ORs with varying amounts of clinical 
experience so that multiple perspectives could be gathered. The OR nurse participants 
were recruited from the healthcare systems within the Louisville metropolitan area. 
Eligibility criteria included currently licensed registered nurses who work primarily in an 
OR setting, over the age of 18, and English-speaking.  
Recruitment 
A group recruitment email was sent to the members of the Kentuckiana 
Association of Operating Room Nurses (AORN) chapter, which serves OR nurses within 
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the metropolitan areas of Louisville, Kentucky and the adjacent Southern Indiana area. 
The email informed the nurses about the study, its purposes, and the request for 
participants. The Kentuckiana AORN Chapter association has over 150 OR nurse 
members, many of whom are employed at various OR facilities within the Louisville 
metropolitan area. In addition, announcements were made at monthly OR staff meetings 
at a Louisville hospital. Flyers were also dispersed to Kentuckiana AORN members 
containing information about the study as well as the contact information of the 
researcher. OR nurses were given the opportunity to call or email the researcher with 
questions about the study or to ask the researcher about participating in the study. After 
contacting the researcher, OR nurses were screened for eligibility, were provided an 
explanation of the study purpose and process, and were provided assurance 
confidentiality. If the OR nurses showed interest in participating, arrangements were 
made to meet them individually in a private location where the interview could take 
place. A non-monetary incentive of a coffee mug, worth about $10.00, was offered to OR 
nurses who agreed to participate. 
Procedure 
Participants for the study included OR nurses who were employed within the 
Louisville, Kentucky metropolitan area in a direct-care OR setting for at least 20 hours 
per week. Each participant signed an informed consent that included full disclosure of the 
study aims. The plan for maintaining confidentiality of data was explained. Data 
regarding the facilities in which the participants worked were not documented.  One-on-
one interviews were performed at locations where a private conversation could be held 
and one that was convenient for the participants, such as the participant’s home, the 
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researcher’s office at University of Louisville School of Nursing, or at a coffee shop. 
Interviews did not take place in the participants’ work setting. Interviews were digitally 
audio recorded.  
Five standard open-ended questions, some of which included additional probe 
questions (Table 2, Appendix), were employed to conduct the qualitative interviews. The 
questions did not focus on the occurrence of adverse events in the OR; rather the 
interview questions addressed daily practices that were concerning and practices that 
potentially set the stage for an adverse event to occur. Specific exploration occurred in 
relation to the nurses’ perceptions of the length of clinical experience and nurse 
engagement as factors that affect safety practices. In addition, a demographic data form 
was completed by each participant. Data gathered through this form included: length of 
clinical experience measured in consecutive years, gender, age, level of education, status 
of OR nurse certification, such as Certified Nurse in the Operating Room (CNOR), and 
number of operating rooms within the department where OR nurses were employed. 
Data Management 
Trustworthiness was a key component to the rigor and credibility of the study; 
therefore, prolonged engagement for approximately one hour with each participant 
occurred to ensure that each participant had adequate time to relay his or her answers 
(Balkin & Kleist, 2017). A digital recorder was used to record each interview. Analytic 
memos were written before, during, and after data collection. This process is consistent 
with Wolf’s (2010) suggestion that researchers should reflect the participants’ viewpoint 
by carefully selecting specific comments, phrases, and expressions that fit the purpose of 
the ethnographic study. The memos written before data collection documented any biases 
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that the researcher may have possessed. Awareness of self, biases, and creed before and 
during data collection was crucial, specifically because the researcher has a history of OR 
nursing (Richards & Morse, 2013). In addition, the phrase “normalization of deviance” 
was purposefully withheld from being part of any interview questions to avoid 
influencing the participants’ words.  The memos written during and after the data 
collection reflected concepts and patterns as they emerged. 
 Ten interviews were completed within a six-week period. To protect the participants’ 
information, after each interview, the recorder was transported within a lock box, the 
code for which was only known by the researcher. The recorded interviews were 
downloaded to an encrypted, password-protected computer as soon as possible after 
which the original recording was deleted from the recording device. Data were 
transcribed by a professional transcriber, and the transcripts were checked for accuracy 
by the researcher.  
Data Analysis 
 Demographic data were entered into SPSS Verison 25.0 (IBM Corp, 2017) to 
attain descriptive statistics related to the participants. Transcripts from the interviews 
were downloaded to the software Dedoose Version 8.0.35, which is web application for 
managing, analyzing, and presenting qualitative and mixed method research data 
(Dedoose, 2018). The data were explored by reading through the entire content, and 
initial memos were written to gather thoughts as they surfaced.  
     The analysis of the transcripts overall was an iterative process that involved 
disassembling the narrative text into compartments of information called codes (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2018). Topic coding occurred initially and involved creating categories 
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for the data as well as determining where the categories fit within the ideas of the 
researcher. The primary purpose of this was to identify material for description, 
categorization, or reflection. The topics were identified as each line of the transcript was 
read. This process is consistent with Wolf‘s (2010) suggestion that researchers should 
reflect the participants’ viewpoint by carefully selecting specific comments, phrases, and 
expressions that fit the purpose of the ethnographic study.  The story of the participants 
reflected their perspective, and details were recorded so that a larger context could be 
gleaned (Richards & Morse, 2013). 
Analytic coding occurred secondarily after topic coding, providing a different 
platform on which to allow new deeper categories, concepts, and themes to emerge 
(Richards & Morse, 2013). This also presented an opportunity to compare themes that 
had emerged from the pilot study data analysis. In addition, comparisons and contrasts 
were drawn to form categorical clusters, which generated meaningful themes relative to 
the aims of the study. Interrelated themes were identified, and grouped coding was done 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) when evidence emerged to suggest that themes 
overlapped in some contexts.  
To increase rigor and trustworthiness, a peer debriefing process took place 
whereby an expert in the field checked the data for congruence (Balkin & Kleist, 2017). 
Each description was confirmed by comparing it to the interview context, and the 
transcripts were reviewed for data that was disproving, discrepant, or negative (Richards 
& Morse, 2013; Balkin & Kleist, 2017). In addition, the researcher applied a member 
check process confirming interview details with two of the participants. Participant 
feedback assured that the collected data and coding of that data fit accordingly. An audit 
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trail was maintained to reflect research events and decisions in such a way that an 
independent auditor could access and understand the process s (Balkin & Kleist, 2017). 
Results 
The participants included ten registered nurses who were working at least 20 
hours per week in an OR within the Louisville metropolitan area. The mean age of the 
participants was 43.4 years (SD=3.03) (Table 1). The mean length of overall nurse 
experience was 17.4 years (SD 11.45), and the mean length of experience specific to the 
OR was 11.1 years (SD 10.7). The mean number of operating rooms within the OR units 
where the participants were employed was 10.7 (SD 5.51). One of the participants had 
CNOR certification, and nine did not. Four of the participants held an Associate degree in 
nursing, and six participants held a Baccalaureate degree in nursing. 
Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Participants (N=10) 
  
Characteristic Mean (SD)  
Age in years 43.4 (3.03)  
Length of experience as a nurse   17.4 (11.45)  
 
 
Length of experience in the OR 11.1 (10.70)  
   
 
Number of ORs in place of employment 10.7 (5.51)  
 Frequency (%)  
CNOR 
   Yes 





Education Level   
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     Diploma 
      Associates degree 
      Baccalaureate degree 





Note. M=mean; SD=standard deviation 
 
Aim 1) Primary Safety Concerns in the OR from the Perspective of Practicing OR 
RNs 
Primary safety concerns in the OR were categorized into two main themes: 
productivity pressures and inadequate staff to support workload. Additional concerns that 
were reported included: “infobesity;” inconsistency of order entry; general complacency 
of staff. Examples of quotes supporting these themes and overall concerns are illustrated 
in Table 3 in the Appendix.  
OR Safety Concern- Theme 1: Productivity Pressures 
Productivity pressures may be defined as an increased emphasis on the quantity of 
services provided over the quality in the interest of revenue generation (Wilbanks et al., 
2018). Eight out of ten participants suggested that productivity was a prevalent safety 
concern where they work. Examples of quotes that contribute to this theme include: 
“Efficiency has kind of given way to patient safety.” and “We’re constantly being made 
to cut corners for efficiency versus reviewing patient records, making sure that we have 
everything, that the patient is stable, all of our ducks lined up in a row.” In addition, one 
participant highlighted that the preoperative assessment as well as the delivery of a 
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complete patient hand-off report to the recovery room staff were inadequate, which was 
primarily due to the pressure of having a fast turnover time between surgeries. 
OR Safety Concern-Theme 2: Inadequate Staff to Support Workload 
An inadequate staff support system was touted as a safety concern, as evidenced 
in four out of ten participant statements. Examples of quotes that contribute to this theme 
include: “The top patient safety [concern] is patient positioning on a narrow bed and 
somebody falling off. At our facility, we don’t have a whole lot of staff, so trying to bring 
the patient into the bed by yourself always concerns me.” and “Room turnovers are tough 
because our staffing situation right now is not ideal as far as people that we hire to turn 
over rooms and stuff.” Although the latter quote reflects a concern of inadequate staff 
support, there is an embedded reflection of productivity pressure because the participant 
is relating this concern with getting surgical OR suites cleaned and prepared between 
surgeries.  
Additional OR Safety Concerns 
OR participants also reported additional OR safety concerns that included 
“infobesity;” inconsistency of order entry; general complacency of staff. Although these 
topics were coded, they were not categorized as themes because they were not seeN as 
common threads that ran through the data (Richards & Morse, 2013).  
 Infobesity, a relatively new term that emerged within the modern urban 
dictionary (Rogers, Puryear, & Root, 2013), refers to the onslaught of excessive amounts 
of information.  The participant who referred to this reflected that it was overwhelming to 
remember all of the competing demands of the role as an OR nurse. This participant also 
admitted that her role as an OR nurse was relatively new, a factor which likely added to 
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concern about safety as evidenced by the following quote: “I’m concerned about being 
new to where I am, doing all the modules and stuff that they have on the computer, a lot 
of the focus is on timeout and fire safety, making sure that’s part of the timeout,  the focus 
that I see concerning is correct site, and patient positioning.” The concept of infobesity 
also emerged as a concern in the pilot study, which was conducted one year earlier.  
Inconsistency of order entry was a concern for one participant as evidenced by the 
following quote “Everybody is supposed to do everything on a computer, but we have 
people that want to fax things, which is allowed. Even though we’re on an electronic 
system, we’re still allowing the paper”. This quote reflected a frustration with 
inconsistency of order entry and the concern that orders would be missed when there is 
more than one way of finding the orders.  
  Generalized staff complacency referred to overall nurse complacency that was 
evident without specifically cited reasons. One participant reported that staff members 
sometimes are distracted and are not as concerned with patient safety as they should as 
evidenced by the following quote:  “I think a lot of times, I see people get distracted and 
they’re talking or not really paying attention.” While this quote referred specifically to a 
safety concern that one participant had, there were many references throughout the 
interviews that alluded to complacency impacting normalization of deviance (See Aim 2). 
Aim 2) Exploration of Normalization of Deviance in the OR 
Seven out of ten participants contributed to evidence that normalization of 
deviance exists in the OR. Although the verbiage “normalization of deviance” was not 
applied to any of the questions to reduce influencing participant responses, the 
participants described normalization of deviance as they spoke about practices in their 
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ORs. Quotes to support the evidence of normalization of deviance include “When you’re 
a new nurse, everything is new, and everything is shiny, but if you’ve been in the OR for a 
number of years, it starts to become so mundane” and “I think sometimes people [OR 
nurses] get comfortable and don’t watch with their tech like counting sponges or 
needles.” Additional quotes to support evidence of normalization of deviance are 
presented in Table 4.  
Aim 3) Perceived Barriers and Facilitators to Adhering to Safety Standards 
As interviews progressed, perceived barriers and facilitators for adherence to 
safety standards were uncovered. Perceived barriers, which were reasons for 
normalization of deviance, were represented by the following five themes: productivity 
pressures, generalized complacency, complacency related to length of experience, social 
pressures, and negative acculturation. Quotes that support these themes are presented in 
Table 5. Facilitators to the adherence to safety standards included OR nurse engagement 
and supportive managerial relationships with OR nurses. Quotes that illustrate facilitators 
are presented in Tables 6.   
Perceived barriers to adhering to safety standards and reasons for normalization of 
deviance  
Theme 1: Productivity Pressures 
Defined as an increased emphasis on the quantity of services provided over the 
quality in the interest of the generation of revenue (Wilbanks et al., 2018), seven out of 
ten participants indicated that productivity pressure was a reason for normalization of 
deviance. The following quotes from 2 OR nurses illustrated how OR nurses’ practice of 
deviating from safety standards has become normalized due to pressures to work faster: 
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“At some facilities, they’ll [OR nurses] cut corners to try to make that productivity” and 
“You’re not being supported to do the right thing, and they just kind of turn their head 
because they want quick turnover”.  
Theme 2: Generalized Complacency 
Three out of ten participants contributed to a theme of generalized complacency. 
While no specific reason for this was presented, participant quotes indicated that OR 
nurses had lulled themselves into a space of perceived safety because adverse events are 
not frequent occurrences. The practices reflective of a generalized complacency included 
the counting process as evidenced by the following quote:  
Absolutely, yes. [some] might cut some corners. Right, they’re so sure of  
themselves that [they think] I got 10 sponges on the back table, I don’t really need 
 to count. I can just look and see. My scrub tech, I trust her. I guess they feel like  
‘this is just another patient; this is just another knee scope’. 
Additional practice areas that illustrated a complacent approach included tasks 
associated with the prevention of surgical site infection as well as the patient care 
required in the immediate post-operative period.  
Theme 3: Complacency related to Length of Experience  
In this theme, specific examples of complacency related to OR nurses’ length of 
experience were presented by six out of ten participants. Although two participants cited 
experience as a strength, asserting that when nurses had more experience, it gave them 
more confidence and voice to speak up for safety, a majority of participants spoke to the 




They [OR nurses] work in the OR for 15-20 years, and they’ve done something 
this way, and then you have new management come in, and that they want to 
adhere by this certain policy that AORN sets or that the hospital sets, and the 
nurses just get upset and say, ‘I’m going to continue my way’  and they don’t 
change their practice.  
Theme 4: Social Pressures 
Four out of ten participants described social factors that influenced their practices. 
For example, one participant indicated that OR nurses who take steps to meticulously 
follow safety standards practices can perform contrary to the prevailing norm, which may 
result in a social ostracization and incivility. The following quote illustrates incivility 
from a team member when an OR nurse adheres to the count policy “I get a dirty look if I 
ask for another count to be done”.  
OR nurses may perceive the adoption of substandard safety practices as a means 
to assimilate into the workplace culture. In addition, OR nurses favored assimilation 
because it was associated with the avoidance of potential incivility. Quotes that illustrate 
this phenomenon include “They’re trying to make the physicians happy, and they’re 
trying to be the staff’s friend, and they’re not adhering to the policy. I’ve seen it happen” 
and “They’re more worried about being liked rather than being a patient advocate 
regarding safety because they’re new, so they want people to like them.” 
Described incivility is sourced from various team members, such as surgeons, 
managers, and peers. Incivility appeared embedded within productivity pressure as 
evidenced in the following quote: “It felt like a struggle at my job to still count and check 
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pans. That is important, but I felt that it displeased my manager, because she would tell 
me I had slow turnover times.”  
Theme 5: Negative Acculturation 
Acculturation refers to a general assimilation to a dominant culture (Cramm & 
Nieboer, 2019). It plays a role in OR nursing because of the uniqueness of the job, and 
many new OR nurses depend heavily on those who precept and guide them. 
Acculturation has both positive and negative aspects; however, when the dominant 
adopted practice is substandard behavior, negative enculturation occurs. Two out of ten 
participants indicated that negative enculturation can be a barrier to safety standards. This 
is especially true with new OR nurses on orientation because they are relativity 
dependent on preceptors for guidelines on practice. Therefore, if a new nurse is not 
guided to follow safety stands wholly, substandard practices will become normalized for 
the new employee.  
I do think it might be lack of education and who is precepting them, because if 
you get a new scrub tech / nurse with a seasoned scrub tech/nurse who doesn’t 
necessarily follow the correct practice, then the new orientee is going to follow 
along in their path and gain what they learned from them. 
Figure 1 
Barriers to adhering to safety standards/Reasons for normalization of deviance as 





Additional barriers to adhering to safety standards 
Disconnection from direct consequences was raised as an additional perceived 
barrier to adhering to safety standards and a reason for normalization of deviance. While 
it was coded as such, it was not categorized a theme because it was presented only once 
during the interviews. Adverse events, such as positioning injuries, are not communicated 
with OR nurses, as in this example, “We don’t ever see any positioning injury [data]. 
None of that is brought to our attention, like when we have monthly meetings, none of 
that is shared with staff at all.” The participant implied that nurses may be lulled into a 
sense of complacency because the sense of peril is assuaged when nurses are not 
informed about adverse events and consequences of behavior.  
Perceived facilitators to adhering to safety standards and protective factors against 
normalization of deviance  






































 Nine out of ten participants indicated that nurse engagement was a prominent 
facilitator to OR nurses’ adherence to safety standards. The following quote illustrates the 
reported positive association between OR nurse engagement and patient safety: 
“Absolutely, 100%. They [engaged nurses] would [practice more safely], because if you 
have somebody that’s more engaged that is not just there for a paycheck,… If they’re 
engaged, you’re going to have patient safety outcomes as a priority.” Further quotes that 
contribute to the positive association between OR nurse engagement and patient safety 
are presented in Table 6. Participants asserted that when nurses are engaged, they are 
happier with their work, they pay attention to details, and they make better safety practice 
decisions compared to nurses who are not engaged. Furthermore, participants alluded that 
OR nurses did not require clinical experience to be engaged.  
Theme 2: Supportive Managerial Relationships with OR nurses 
Each participant was asked to describe the relationship between OR nurses and 
administration/ management personnel.  Three out of ten participants reflected that they 
enjoyed supportive relationships with their managers, and it was inferred that positive 
relationships facilitated the adherences to safety standards and promoted OR nurse 
engagement:  
I’m more engaged in the facility where I am now. The management is amazing. 
It’s the best place I’ve ever worked. I enjoy getting up in the morning. I enjoy 
going and meeting my patients. It seems like if management cares more about me, 
I care more about my patients. I’m happy to get up and go to work and take care 
of the patients that I do and do the cases that I do. And everybody there feels the 
same way, so everybody’s excited to come to work. 
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While it was gleaned that OR nurses felt more supported and engaged by positive 
managerial support, there was evidence that negative relationships exist. For example, six 
out of ten participants inferred that relationships with management was fragmented and 
that OR nurses perceived that their managers did not understand the challenges of the OR 
nurse role. For example, “I don’t think they [managers] know everything that goes on; 
they just see a start time and an end time. They don’t really see what is happening; they 
don’t understand the whole scope of care” and “I don’t think they [managerial personnel] 
have a clue about it [the challenges].” Additional quotes illustrating fragmented 
relationships between OR nurses and their managers are illustrated in Table 7. 
Discussion 
Normalization of deviance is stealth in character because it can appear innocuous 
for an extended period. It is characterized by employees adjusting their behavior to fit a 
process that is perceived to be more efficient and logical; employees speciously conclude 
that deviation is acceptable because what can go wrong typically does not (Price & 
Williams, 2018). The concept remains relatively new in healthcare, and the exploration of 
such is key to its acknowledgement, which is a crucial first step to mitigating its perilous 
nature.   
The study’s findings had some commonalties and contrasts with the findings from 
a pilot study, which was conducted one year earlier. The themes that emerged as reasons 
for normalization of deviance in the pilot study were as follows: productivity pressures, 
generalized complacency, experience-related variation, infobesity, and workplace 
incivility. While productivity pressure and generalized complacency emerged from both 
the pilot study and the current study, there were some variations between other themes 
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from both studies. For example, experience-related variation was a reference to length of 
experience being an influencing factor over the adherence to safety standards. In the pilot 
study, most of the participants referred to length of clinical experience as a strength, 
specifically in relation to the confidence to speak up for safety, a trait that may 
accompany those who have more clinical experience. However, most of the participants 
in the current study indicated that length of experience was not a strength and was 
associated with lax attitudes towards safety. In addition, information overload, also 
known as “infobesity,” was not a theme identified in the current study as a reason for 
normalization of deviance; however, it was presented by one participant as a safety 
concern in the current study. Workplace incivility was noted in both studies, but the 
theme was labeled as social pressure in the current study because it incorporated other 
social factors, such as a desire to fit in with the prevailing culture.  Negative acculturation 
emerged from the current study as a reason for normalization of deviance but it was not 
identified in the pilot study.   
Productivity pressure was by far the most prevalent theme that was uncovered 
during the interviews, and it presented as both a safety concern and a barrier to safety 
standards adherence, leading to normalization of deviance. In addition, it was a factor that 
was embedded in the theme of inadequate staff to support workload as a safety concern, 
and it was embedded within the theme of social pressures as a reason for normalization of 
deviance.   
The study results supported the inference that OR nurses sometimes make 
attempts to reduce the turnover time by taking shortcuts on safety standards between 
surgical cases to ease pressure stemming from surgeons, managers, and even peers. The 
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melding of productivity pressure and social pressure is congruent with Dekker’s (2011) 
suggestion that deviation from safety standards can occur because of factors, such as 
time, cost, and peer pressure. As the theme of social pressure with an underlay of 
productivity pressure was presented as a barrier to maintaining safety standards, it is 
evident that an environment of respect and civility should be fostered to promote a 
healthy work environment and one that primarily focuses on patient safety. In addition, 
nurses should be able work in an OR environment that discourages incivility or any other 
kind of social pressures to prevent assimilation into a negative culture that deviates from 
safety standards. The OR nurse role incorporates a myriad of tasks, each of which can 
carry grave safety implications, and each needs to be done meticulously every time to 
assuage the risk for surgical patients. Therefore, when OR nurses take the time to adhere 
to safety standards, they should not be the subject of incivility from other team members.  
Possible reasons that productivity pressure appeared to be a ubiquitous force is the 
OR’s prevalent role as a revenue generator as well as steep operating costs. The OR  has 
been described as the “financial hub” of any hospital” (Rothstein & Raval, 2018, p 79), 
and it can generate up to  65% of hospital profit margins (Peters et al., 2018). In addition, 
it is estimated that OR operating costs are between $15.00 and $50.00 per minute (Kaye 
et al. 2015).  These are factors that can place an inordinate pressure on OR nurses to 
complete tasks hurriedly, a practice that may drive them to migrate past the boundaries of 
what is deemed to be safe (Amalberti et al, 2006; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017).  
Within the past decade, ORs have adopted manufacturing industry standards to 
streamline efficiencies, many of which include reducing waste, standardizing production 
steps, and lowering personnel costs (Rothstein & Raval, 2018); however, OR units are 
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unlike manufacturing industries due to the extreme variability and unpredictability that is 
typically presented in the OR.  For example, the OR is a multi-layered environment 
comprised of complex social interactions within a multi-disciplinary team with 
expectations to perform a variety of high-risk invasive procedures. In addition, surgical 
patients introduce a myriad of unpredictability, such as existing comorbidities that may 
affect the preparation for surgery or even a last-minute cancellation. Therefore, it is 
unrealistic to apply manufacturing industry efficiency standards to an environment that 
carries vast amounts of unpredictability and human risk.  
The prevalence of productivity pressure that is placed on OR nurses needs to be 
highlighted to illustrate to management what the dangers of this kind of pressure has on 
patient safety. While fiscal responsibilities and efficiencies are warranted in the OR, the 
pressure to work faster with fewer resources may encourage inattention to precision and 
adventitious deviance from safety standards, which can set the stage for patient harm and 
stymie a culture of safety.  
Generalized complacency as well as complacency related to length of experience 
were two separate themes that emerged from the data analysis. Participants did not 
indicate that OR nurses had poor intentions for patient safety; rather, this substandard 
safety practice was a normalized behavior that had occurred over time, specifically 
because the risk of adverse events appeared to be miniscule or absent. While generalized 
complacency, unrelated to length of clinical experience, as a reason for normalization of 
deviance was reflected during the interviews, complacency specifically related to length 
of experience was reported by twice as many participants.  Length of OR nurse 
experience may be advantageous due to a potentially higher confidence levels coupled 
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with an ability to speak-up for safety associated with experience; however,  it did not 
appear that OR nurses’ length of experience was  protective against normalization of 
deviance in the OR. This study finding was somewhat incongruent with Benner’s (1984) 
Novice to Expert theory, which suggests that nurses gain valuable skills as their 
experience increases, which increases their clinical decision-making abilities consistent 
with sound judgment and safety.  
The theme of negative acculturation was an indication that OR nurses should be 
formally prepared for and supported in the role of precepting new OR nurses with a focus 
on patient safety. OR nurse educators can be instrumental in providing formal checkoff 
competency forms and guidelines that support OR nurse preceptors.  Educator support 
can ensure that new OR nurses are being guided to adhere to safety standards, preventing 
new OR nurses from adopting substandard safety practices from preceptors.  
In addition to the themes outlining the reasons for normalization of deviance that 
were gleaned from the study, one participant inferred that there is a lack of transparency 
in reporting and discussing adverse events in the OR, implying a lack of connection 
between the consequences of poor practices and negative patient outcomes. While 
disconnecting consequences from actions was not considered a theme in this study, the 
inference of the possibility of such a disconnection is a troubling sign that this issue is 
unique to OR nursing. For instance, surgical patients are in the OR for a relatively short 
period, and adverse events that are potentially related to substandard nursing practice 
may not be apparent immediately. For example, adverse events related to inadequate care 
during patient positioning under general anesthesia, surgical site infections related to 
substandard aseptic technique, or unintentional retainment of a foreign object related to 
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poor attention during the count process, and not be acknowledged until later time, or not 
at all. The relative lack of awareness of adverse event consequences can be problematic 
because it can blunt OR nurses’ perception of risk, which is a factor that can encourage 
normalization of deviance.  
In relation to facilitators to safety standards adherence, OR nurse engagement 
emerged as a prevalent characteristic fortifying OR nurses against pressure to deviate 
from safety standards. This specific finding is congruent with past studies that examined 
relationships between nurse engagement and safety (Salanova et al., 2003; Sonnentag, 
2003; Brooks Carthon, et al., 2019). None of these studies however focused on OR nurses 
or the OR setting.  
 Supportive managerial relationships with OR nurses also emerged as a facilitator 
to the adherence to safety standards and a protective factor against normalization of 
deviance. This finding aligns with findings of Price and Williams’ (2018) indicating that 
leadership involvement has a pertinent role in patient safety, and unintended 
consequences of poor leadership affect patient safety negatively. In addition, Harvey and 
Sotardi (2017) suggested that risks to patient safety can be mitigated when those in 
leadership positions examine policies and processes with input from direct-care 
employees in a non-punitive and supportive environment. They also suggested that 
feedback from direct-care employees was a powerful conduit to understand the basis for 
why standards are not followed wholly. Therefore, relationships between OR nurses and 
management need to be fortified and energized with respect and understanding with a 
goal of nurturing a healthy work environment that promotes OR nurse engagement.  
 53 
 
Transparency is another benefit of improved relationships between OR nurses and 
their managers. For example, most participants indicated their managers did not 
understand the challenges that OR nurses face. Participants suggested that managers 
placed unrealistic expectations on OR nurses to perform faster without the necessary 
support. It is therefore essential for OR managers to acknowledge challenges that OR 
nurses encounter, and it is imperative that barriers to safety standard adherence and 
reasons for normalization of deviance be acknowledged and understood, so that solutions 
can be offered. For example, the expectation to adhere to scrupulous and necessary safety 
standards should be paired with enough support to meet productivity goals. In addition, 
there should be open discussions relating to adverse events, deviations from safety 
standards, and near- misses in a non-punitive, civil environment so that OR nurses can 
feel empowered to defend safety standards and be more aware of the potential and actual 
adverse events.  
Limitations 
Limitations to the study include participants working within the same 
metropolitan, geographical location, which may affect the transferability of the findings 
to other geographical areas.  In addition, some reasons for normalization of deviance 
were identified and coded, but they were not categorized as themes because of the 
infrequency of quotes to support the reasons, which is an indication that data saturation 
may not have been reached in its entirety.  
Conclusions 
The OR is a high-risk environment, and although adverse events do not occur 
frequently, OR nurses have safety concerns. Some of the most prevalent safety concerns 
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reported were productivity pressures and inadequate staff to support workload, while 
other concerns included “infobesity,” inconsistency of order entry, and general 
complacency of staff. There is evidence that normalization of deviance exists in the OR, 
and five primary reasons for the deviation identified in this study were: productivity 
pressures, generalized complacency, complacency related to length of experience, social 
pressures, and negative acculturation. Facilitators to the adherence to safety standards 
included OR nurse engagement and a positive supportive relationship with managerial 
personnel.     
Evidence of normalization of deviance within the OR should serve as a warning light on 
the dashboard of OR safety, and one that signals a problematic system deserving of 
attention before surgical patients’ lives and wellbeing are jeopardized. This phenomenon 
must become a priority when discussing how to maintain safety standards for vulnerable 
surgical patients who rely on their OR teams to maintain their safety and wellbeing 
during the surgical period. Finally, it is imperative to encourage an environment that 
supports adherence to OR safety standards, such as the employment of strategies to 
promote and sustain OR nurse engagement and efforts to foster  







Table 2. Interview Questions 
 
 Interview Questions 
1 In your practice, what do you see as the top safety concerns at your OR department?  
2.  Describe areas of OR personnel practice that you consider unsafe or potentially set the stage for an adverse event to occur? 
Probe There are specific guidelines in place to help prevent two of the surgical “Never Events” include: Wrong Site/Person 
Surgery and Retained Foreign Objects. Do you have examples where you have seen how personnel may increase patients’ 
vulnerability in relation to these two never events?   
 
3. Describe any other concerns that you have relating to patient safety in the OR?  
Probe Describe how you think personnel practices from a safety standpoint? 
Probe How do you think the length of experience affect how personnel practice from a patient safety standpoint? 
Probe How do you think overall nurse engagement, for example, nurses who are absorbed in their work or those who have a 
positive attitude about their work, affect how nursing personnel practice from a patient safety standpoint?  
 
4. Tell me what you think are facilitators to adhering to OR standards and protocols? 
5. Describe any barriers that you perceive as obstacles that impede safety practices? 
Probe Describe how you think productivity pressures may affect practice? 
6. Describe the relationship between OR nurses and managers where you work 











Table 3. Quotes supporting primary safety concerns in the OR:  Practicing OR nurse perspectives (Study Aim 1) 
 





“Everything is all about getting patients in (the OR) exactly on time, turnover time, but the cases get more 
complex, but we don’t get any more time to prepare, so I feel like where that corner gets cut is doing 
assessments, doing all the pre-work we need before patients come into the OR.”  
(Reported by 
eight of out ten 
participants) 
“Personally where I work, it’s all about money and less about patient care now.” 
 “The top patient concern (that) is most prevalent is time efficiency versus just general good medicine.” 
 “We’re (OR nurses) constantly being made to cut corners for efficiency versus reviewing patient records, 
making sure that we have everything, that the patient is stable, all of our ducks lined up in a row. “ 
 “I see more and more responsibilities being loaded on to OR nursing, which further decreases that time that we 
have to prepare for our cases, check our patients in, make sure there’s a continuity of care between pre-op and 
intraop.” 
 “They’re (managers) pushing you to get more cases done; surgeons are pushing you, and administration is 
pushing you”  
 “We’ve never had a fire, but not allowing the 3-minute drying time rule on skin preps, because nurses are feeling 
rushed by the surgeons for time is concerning;”  
 “Efficiency has kind of given way to patient safety.” 
 “I’m worried about med errors a lot of the time ….just because I’m feeling rushed.” 













“The top patient safety (concern) is patient positioning on a narrow bed and somebody falling off. At our facility, 
we don’t have a whole lot of staff, so trying to bring the patient into the bed by yourself always concerns me.” 
(Reported by 
four out of ten  
participants)  
“The lack of staffing that we have to help support the amount of patients we have because a lot of times we’re 
lifting patients without having enough staff members. So, it’s potential risk for a patient to fall down or fall off 
the OR table and transition.” 
 
 “We don’t have as many people as we should right now”  
 “Room turnovers (time), are tough because our staffing situation right now is not ideal as far as people that we 
hire to turn over rooms and stuff” 
 
Additional Safety 




“I’m concerned about being new to where I am, doing all the modules and stuff that they have on the 
computer, a lot of the focus is on timeout and fire safety, making sure that’s part of the timeout, the focus that I 
see concerning correct site, and patient positioning.”  
b) Inconsistency  
order entry 
“Everybody is supposed to do everything on a computer, but we have people that want to fax things, which is 












Table 4. Quotes supporting the occurrence of normalization of deviance in the OR (Study Aim 2) 






of deviance in 
the OR 
“When you’re a new nurse, everything is new, and everything is shiny, but if you’ve been in the OR for a number of 
years, it starts to become so mundane, and people just start cutting corners a bit here and there.”   
(Reported by 
seven out of 
ten 
participants) 
“We all know it’s not right, but it just happens” 
 
 “I think sometimes people [OR nurses] get comfortable and don’t watch with their tech like counting sponges or 
needles.” 
 
 “Sometimes it’s like you should just have a blind faith that she’s doing her job and keeping track of everything. I’ve 
had to dig through garbage looking through for needles and sponges, so I just don’t think people think about that; I 
think sometimes it becomes a casual environment.” 
 
 “I actually felt like a black sheep because I would count instruments and check wraps before getting the patient. It’s 
so fast-paced, you don’t really have the time to count with your tech” 
 
 “The more you’re being pushed, the more you just do it because there is no one else to do it. I think a lot of times, 
they’re just ‘oh well, this is how things are done’” 
 
 We’ve never had a fire but our preps are not used the correct way; not allowing the 3-minute rule, because nurses 
are rushed for time” 
 
 “If we work together, I trust you; I know that you’ve never had anything bad happen; so I know you haven’t 
counted needles, but I make the assumption [that nothing bad will happen]. It’s just normal routine; it’s the same 







Table 5  
Quotes supporting perceived barriers to adhering to safety standards in the OR; Reasons for normalization of deviance (Study Aim 3) 






“I would say 95% of our nurses fall into the pressure because if you don’t, then they [managerial personnel] will call 
into your room and ask ‘Why aren’t you ready? What are you doing? We need to hurry up and get these cases 
done’…and that makes their [OR nurses] anxiety peak; things haven’t been counted, and you’re trying to hurry up 
and count and put drugs on the field. There’s just  a lot of room for error because you can’t do five things at once 
while the patient’s in the room and be safe at the same time” 
 
(Reported by 
seven out of 
ten 
participants) 
“In the environment that I was in where you’re not being supported to do the right thing, and they just kind of turn 
their head because they want quick turnover, so it’s like they’re not enforcing pans getting checked  or safety issue 
with power cords” 
 
 “There’s pressure [from] the physicians who push you to get the patient back [to the OR] when you are not ready. I 
do feel like sometimes [nurses] cave and run out to get the patient in the room- there’s noise and confusion, and a lot 
going on”  
 
 “It’s like we’re trying to get this case going, so high priority is not checking that pan to see if it’s sterile.” 
 “Some nurses really don’t do the 3 minutes [referring to waiting for alcohol-based skin preps to dry] like they’re 
supposed to because of time and the surgeon is in the room looking, waiting, and wanting to start” 
 “The timeout thing, they [OR nurses] are just trying to make surgeons happy [by hastening the process] and not making 
patient safety their top priority”  
 “We’ve never had a fire but our preps are not used the correct way; not allowing the 3-minute rule, because nurses are 
rushed for time”  
 “They’re pushing to get more cases done, and the surgeons are pushing you, the administration is pushing you”  
 “When you’re trying to turn a room over quickly, I’m saying [the cleaning of ] the underneath stuff [may not get done 
properly] 











“Oh, I think absolutely, yes [that some] might cut some corners. Right, they’re so sure of themselves that [they think] 
I know they got 10 sponges on the back table, I don’t really need to count. I can just look and see. My scrub tech, I 
trust her.” I guess they feel like ‘this is just another patient. This is just another knee scope.’” 
(Reported by 
three out of 
ten 
participants) 
“People just get used to the way they’ve always done things”  
 “I think sometimes it can be a safety thing because people are coming in the room [OR] and they’re being loud and 
talking, and you still have a patient in there; it could cause a distraction with people waking up from surgery.” 
 At the other place I worked a lot of people, it’s things getting overlooked, like a dirty light handle left on, things not 
getting wiped down. We did a lot of pediatric dental, people trying to do things quickly and having blood left on 
stuff in a previous case.” 
 “I think sometimes people get comfortable and don’t watch with their tech like counting sponges or needles”  








“They [OR nurses] work in the OR for 15-20 years, and they’ve done something this way, and then you have new 
management come in, and that they want to adhere by this certain policy that AORN sets or that the hospital sets, 
and the nurses just get upset and say, ‘I’m going to continue my way’  and they don’t change their practice” 
 
(Reported by 
six out of ten 
participants) 
 
“I see some nurses that have been there a really long time, not necessarily just ones that I have experienced, but some 
of them I think do get a little lax with counts.” 
 
 “It just happens because nurses who’ve been working for a long time sometimes get lax or complacent just because 
honestly, they might be a little burnt out. And they feel like they’re tired, and it’s easier to do it their way instead of 







 “A lot of times that’s more of the seasoned nurses that are used to doing things the way they’ve always done them 
and not wanting to change. I think it’s a little dangerous.” 
 
 “Well, to go back where I worked before, I know one of the techs had been a tech for a long time, but I would see 
her in the hallway carrying an instrument pan on its side. She would open up pans without checking the wrappers on 
them.” 
 ”I think it’s hard for anyone who has been doing something that long to adapt to a new practice. But I do think it affects 
patient safety when you don’t adhere to a policy”  
 “You have the people who are ready for retirement, and I think some just tune out and it becomes ‘I’m sick of this’.” 




“They’re more worried about being liked rather than being a patient advocate regarding safety because they’re new, 
so they want people to like them.” 
(Reported by 
four out of 
ten 
participants) 
“They’re trying to make the physicians happy, and they’re trying to be the staff’s friend, and they’re not adhering to 
the policy. I’ve seen it happen. “ 
 “I get a dirty look if I ask for another count to be done”  
 “I actually felt like the black sheep, because I would count my instruments and check the wrappers before I would go 
get the patient, and they would be pushing me to go get the patient.  So, yeah, I did feel a little like what I was doing 
was out of the norm.”  
 “Yeah, there was a disconnect, and a lot of favoritism…like the social part of it seemed to be more important than 
prioritizing things that were going on with patients and the cases.” 
 “I’ve just been in a situation where one particular surgeon was rushing me, and I made a mistake because of it. I 
mean, the patient ended up being fine, but it was scary. I need a second to figure out what I was doing.  And he was 
yelling, and it was very intimidating, and that’s not fair to the patient for him to be behaving that way because that 






 “It felt like a struggle at my other job to still counting and checking pans. That is important, but I felt that it 
displeased my manager, because she would tell me I had slow turnover times.” 
 “We have some doctors who want what they want; ‘they want it yesterday’ kind of mentality. And if they don’t get it 
immediately, it’s gets stressful really quick. All of a sudden when someone is yelling at you, you’re like ‘OK’”  




“I do think it might be lack of education and who is precepting them, because if you get a new scrub tech/nurse with 
a seasoned scrub tech/nurse who doesn’t necessarily follow the correct practice, then the new orientee is going to 
follow along in their path and gain what they learned from them. “ 
(Reported by 
two out of ten 
participants)  
 
“And then we had some nurses that were new to the OR, and they’re following what other people are doing, like not 






Quotes supporting perceived facilitators to the Adherence of Safety Standards/Protective factors against normalization of deviance  
(Study Aim 3) 
Nurse Engagement and its Role in Safety Practices  




 “Oh, engagement is important 100% because if you aren’t wanting to be at work, you might miss a step. If you’re 
tucking arms and you just want to hurry up and get them tucked and you don’t use a grate to protect their elbows or 
something, just little things that could definitely affect patient safety. And counting, just wanting to hurry up and get 
it done so you can get these cases started and not worrying about opening up the packs, and things like that. So, I 
definitely can see that engagement influences safety.” 
(Reported by 
nine  out of 
ten 
participants) 







 “Yeah, if your mind is elsewhere, if you’re not happy in what you’re doing and it’s a sense of doom, then it’s not 
going to be good outcomes that happen. I think if you’re focused and your employees are happy, then that shows on 
into the patients.  
 “Yeah, I think if you’re not engaged, you probably honestly don’t care as much, and when you don’t care as much, it 
affects your patients, I think.” 
 
 “Absolutely, 100%. They (engaged nurses) would (practice safer), because if you have somebody that’s more engaged 
that is not just there for a paycheck, or they’re not just there because nurses make a decent salary. If they’re there for 
the right reasons and they’re engaged, you’re going to have patient safety outcomes as a priority, for sure 100%” 
 “You’ve got to enjoy what you’re doing and be concerned about the procedure and outcome for that patient.  
 “Engagement helps you be more conscientious about what you’re doing”. Certainly, if you’re engaged in something, 
you care about what you’re doing…and you’re better at your job” 
 “I think engagement definitely helps you be more conscientious about what you’re doing.” 
 
 “So if you have somebody coming in that’s unhappy and doesn’t want to be there, then that goes onto the patient; it 
doesn’t stop. It tumbleweeds from there and bad outcomes can happen, just from attitude” 
 
 






”I’m more engaged in the facility where I am now. The management is amazing. It’s the best place I’ve ever worked. 
I enjoy getting up in the morning. I enjoy going and meeting my patients. It seems like if management cares more 
about me, I care more about my patients. I’m happy to get up and go to work and take care of the patients that I do and 
do the cases that I do. And everybody there feels the same way, so everybody’s excited to come to work.”  
 
(Reported by 
three out of 
ten 
participants) 
“I feel like we have a pretty good relationship with our management. They’re very open to—like I feel like I can go 
talk to my manager if I feel like I’ve made a mistake or something and I need to fess or something, I totally feel 
comfortable doing that with my manager. She is very experienced. She was in the OR forever as a circulator, so I feel 







 “Yeah, it’s good [relationship with management] It’s kind of like sometimes I have to stop myself because of the 
pressure that I felt from my other job, and they’re not pushing me [in this current job] like that.  
 
 “Our manager comes and helps us clean rooms and turn rooms over. She helps us lift patients. She helps us, she 











Quotes representing unsupportive managerial relationships with OR nurses  









“I don’t think they (managerial personnel) have a clue about it ( the challenges)” “If there is a 30-minute surgery 
turnover time, they may not understand that there was a gross contamination spill and if we hurried through clean-




six out of ten 
participants) 
“I think they (managers) need to come work in the OR a couple of times a year to see what it is like”  
 “I think they (managers) are not there to see what goes on in the OR”  
 
 “The expectations (from managers) that are put on you are unrealistic” 
 
 “I think we feel like we sometimes fall on deaf ears when we talk to the person above who is over all of surgical 
services. Administration has no clue what it’s like to in surgery, I  mean they don’t ever really come back to surgery 
to see what happens there”  
 
  “I don’t think they (managers) have a clue; they don’t go in the room; they are not turning over; they don’t 
understand how it is”  
 
 “I don’t think they (managers) know everything that goes on; they just see a start time and an end time. They don’t 






 CHAPTER IV 
EXAMINING FACTORS THAT PREDICT CULTURE OF SAFTEY IN THE 
OPERATING ROOM (OR) 
Background 
A culture of safety within a healthcare facility is determined by the internalized 
values and creed of facility personnel, which are reflective of their behaviors, and it is 
associated with positive patient outcomes. Achieving and sustaining a culture of safety 
has particular salience in the operating room (OR) because it is a one of the most intricate 
and complicated work environments in healthcare. OR personnel work within a fallible 
system weakened by productivity pressures and team instability, factors that add risk to 
patient safety.  Therefore, a culture of safety in the OR is critical to thwart errors in this 
high-risk environment, and it is imperative to examine the factors that support a culture 
of safety.  
Purpose 
The purposes of this study were to: (1) examine relationships between length of 
OR nurse experience, OR nurse engagement, and culture of safety in the OR, (2) examine 
if length of OR nurses’ clinical experience and OR nurse engagement predict culture of 
safety in the OR, and (3) determine differences in culture of safety in the OR based on 




A convenience sample of 96 OR nurses were recruited from an electronic and 
social media platform. Safety culture attitudes were measured using the Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SAQ). Nurse engagement was measured using the Utrecht Work 
Engagement Scale (UWES). Length of nurse experience measured in years was collected 
using a demographic data collection form. Bivariate associations between the following 
variables were examined: length of OR nurses’ clinical experience and OR culture of 
safety; OR nurse engagement with OR culture of safety; and length of OR nurses’ 
experience and OR nurse engagement. A standard multiple linear regression was 
conducted to examine if length of OR nurse experience and OR nurse engagement were 
predictors of OR culture of safety. In addition, an independent sample t-test was 
conducted to examine if safety of culture scores were statically significantly different in 
those who had a CNOR compared to those without certification.   
Findings 
    The length of OR nurse experience was positively correlated with OR culture of 
safety; however, the relationship was weak, and it was not statistically significant. In 
contrast, OR nurse engagement had a strong, statistically significant relationship with OR 
culture of safety, and was a significant predictor of culture of safety in the OR. Finally, 
OR nurses who had a CNOR certification showed a statistically significantly higher 
culture of safety scores compared with those without CNOR certification.    
     Introduction 
Patient safety is the foundation for providing healthcare and has been compared to 
the provision of biological, physiological, and safety needs from Maslow’s hierarchy 
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model (Maslow, 1954; Ulrich & Kear, 2014). Singer et al. (2009) concluded that a culture 
of safety within a healthcare facility was associated with higher levels of healthcare  
personnel safety-related behaviors and better patient outcomes, which established a link 
between a healthcare organization’s culture of safety and patient safety.  
Safety in healthcare became a prominent focus within the industry two decades ago 
when the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 1999 report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System, reported that adverse events occur in up to 3.7% of annual admissions, 
and 13.6 % of these events lead to patient mortality. The 1999 IOM report stated that 
errors within the healthcare industry were responsible for approximately 44,000 to 98,000 
patient deaths in the United States annually (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). The 
report asserted that errors were not the result of incompetent people making mistakes; 
rather, healthcare errors are multi-faceted and embedded within a culture. 
While a culture of safety carries importance throughout the healthcare industry, it 
holds specific prominence in the operating room (OR) because of its information-
intensive, high–risk nature. In addition, OR personnel work within a fallible system 
weakened by time pressures, goal conflicts, team instability, and significant authority 
disparity between various disciplines (Carthey, 2014). Although OR safety has been 
highlighted in the literature, and consequently efforts have been made to mitigate 
deficiencies in OR safety systems, safety violations continue to be a problem, and 
adverse events in the OR remain a serious threat to surgical patients (Zahiri et al., 2011; 
Goldenberg & Elterman, 2019).  
Surgical patients are some of the most vulnerable patients in healthcare. Due to 
procedural medications, anesthesia, invasive procedures, and general procedural 
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restrictions applied to surgical patients, they often relinquish their independence as well 
as their ability to speak or act on their own behalf, thereby placing an explicit trust in the 
surgical team that cares for them during the operative period. The surgical team has a 
prodigious responsibility to be mindful stewards of safety practices for the patients in 
their care and achieve and sustain a culture of safety in the OR environment.  The OR is a 
complex, high-risk environment, and safety for patients is dependent on a sound safety 
culture with practices that adhere to safety standards. It is imperative therefore to 
examine OR safety culture and associated factors.  
The culture of safety in the OR should be examined before adverse events occur so 
that a more transparent understanding can be gleaned from processes and environmental 
influences that affect safety can be identified. This is in contrast to a statement made by 
Christian et al. (2006) when they reported that many studies of OR safety are done after 
an adverse event occurs. Espin et al. (2006) concluded that deficiencies in the culture of 
safety of ORs were problematic, and they acknowledged that while improving patient 
safety in the OR was a challenge, a crucial first step was to explore related and influential 
factors.  
The purpose of this study was to examine relationships between length of OR nurse 
experience, OR nurse engagement, and OR culture of safety, in addition to investigate if 
the length of OR nurse experience and nurse engagement are predictors of OR culture of 
safety.   
 The specific aims and hypotheses pertaining to the study were to:  
1) Explore the relationships between length of OR nurses’ experience, OR nurse 
engagement, and OR culture of safety 
 70 
 
H1: there is a positive relationship between the length of the OR nurse 
experience and OR culture of safety   
H2: there is a positive relationship between OR nurse engagement and OR 
culture of safety 
H3: there is a positive relationship between the length of the OR nurse 
experience and OR nurse engagement 
2) Determine if length of OR nurse experience and nurse engagement predict OR 
culture of safety    
H4: Length of the OR nurse experience and OR nurse engagement 
predicts OR culture of safety 
3) Identify the extent that the variance in OR culture of safety is explained by the 
length OR nurse experience and OR nurse engagement.  
4) Determine differences in OR culture of safety based on certification in OR 
nursing (CNOR).  
   Background and Significance  
A culture of safety has been defined as “a set of values that are shared within an 
organization that relate to what is important and beliefs about how the organizational 
structure should be to produce behavioral norms that promote safety” (Singer, Lin, 
Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009, p 400).  Singer et al. (2009) concluded that a culture of 
safety within a healthcare facility is determined by the internalized values and creed of 
facility personnel, which are reflective of their behaviors. 
Attaining and sustaining a safety culture for healthcare gained a robust traction 
after the IOM’s 1999 report To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, which 
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outlined sobering statistics on healthcare errors and adverse patient outcomes. The report 
was an impetus that prompted healthcare systems to examine their personnel’s safety-
related behavior (King, 2010; Kohn et al., 2000). As a result, many healthcare facilities 
made strides to improve safety behaviors, such as efforts to improve teamwork and to 
introduce transparent reporting of errors in a non-punitive manner (Espin, Lingard, 
Baker, & Regehr, 2006), initiatives that were deemed crucial to modify the culture of 
safety and to address the sociological contributors to safety practices (King, 2010; Zahiri 
et al., 2011). Despite significant efforts by many healthcare organizations to improve 
safety behaviors, medical errors persisted, generating substantial personal and monetary 
cost (IOM, 2006). Brooks Carthron et al. (2019) asserted that many of the endeavors 
aimed at increasing safety over the past 20 years focused on checklists and improved 
healthcare records rather than assessing work environments and overall culture, and they 
asserted that more work was required to attain optimal safety standards.  
The culture of safety has a distinct salience in the OR in light of the high–risk nature 
of the complex and multi-faceted environment (Wright, 2016; Link, 2019). ORs typically 
have sophisticated technology and team members comprised of different professions who 
work irregular hours within a stressful environment, factors that can enhance the risk for 
error (Ongun & Intepeler, 2017). While efforts to mitigate risk occur in the OR, 
iatrogenic adverse events remain a significant threat to surgical patients (Goldenberg & 
Elterman, 2019).  
U.S. ORs had close to 10,000 never-events, which are occurrences that include 
wrong-site, wrong-procedure, wrong-person surgeries, and retained surgical items, 
between 1990 and 2010.  Almost 7% of these events resulted in a patient’s death. In 
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addition, over $1.3 billion was paid toward malpractice claims related to those events, the 
payments for which did not encompass the financial strain of legal fees, patient disability, 
lost work time, and defamation of the surgical team and facility involved (Mehtsun, 
Ibrahim, Diener-West, Pronovost, & Makary, 2013).  
In 2004, the Joint Commission required the use of the Universal Protocol,  a process 
that mandated a carefully plotted process of patient and procedure identifications prior to 
surgery to increase patient safety standards by avoiding the occurrence of wrong site or 
wrong patient procedures (The Joint Commission, 2004).  However, this adopted protocol 
did not meet its expected intentions; the standardized protocol failed to prevent such 
events (Stahel, Mehler, Clarke, & Varnell, 2009). According to Stahel et al. (2009), 
reasons for the failure of the  Universal Protocol included inconsistencies in site-marking 
procedures, discrepancies in education for staff, and general deviations from the intended 
protocol (Stahel et al., 2009; Banschbach, 2009). King (2010) reported that although the 
IOM purported that system weaknesses caused errors in the OR, managers have 
suggested that lack of adherence to safety protocols and an etiolated safety culture were 
primary reasons.   
While it is reasonable to suggest that the data on reported adverse events in the OR 
should  influence the needle of the safety culture compass and subsequently guide efforts 
to increase or sustain a safety culture, a relative absence of reported adverse events does 
not necessarily determine a sound safety culture. One of the reasons for this is that 
currently, the reporting of adverse events in the U.S., surgical never-events or otherwise, 
is ambiguous and poorly understood (Austin & Pronovost, 2015; Goldenberg & 
Elterman, 2019). Challenges with reporting data are due to lack of transparency and 
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suboptimal standardized national reporting systems and definitions. Specifically, 
prospectively collected data on the incidence of surgical never-events are limited, and 
many studies involve voluntary reporting to external agencies with an inherent bias 
(Austin & Pronovost, 2015; Theils et al. 2015; Goldenberg & Elterman, 2019). In 
addition, reporting of events can be associated with fear of litigation and potential insult 
to professional reputations (Goldenberg & Elterton, 2019). Apart from adverse events, 
near-misses, defined as events that did not cause patient harm but had potential to do so 
(Goldenberg & Elterton, 2019), are enormously challenging to capture and report 
adequately because of their subjective nature in addition to perception biases and 
difficulty of detail recollection. The lack of comprehensive data reporting of adverse 
events or near misses is therefore problematic because the reality that flawed safety 
systems may not be overt. This is subject to pacifying OR personnel into a perception that 
the existing safety system is more robust than is true, which could dull efforts to mitigate 
deficiencies in safety-related processes.   
Regardless, however, of reported data, Goldenberg and Elterman (2019) suggested 
that efforts to improve OR safety should be channeled in proactive and prospective 
manners rather than reacting to the occurrence of adverse events. The culture of safety 
should be examined before adverse events occur so that a more transparent understanding 
can be gleaned from the processes, and environmental influences that affect safety can be 
identified.  
Researchers have studied various factors that correlate with OR culture of safety, 
such as the complexity of facilities, the use of checklists, and safety performance 
behaviors (Carney, West, Neily, Mills, & Bagian, 2010; Lepanluoma, Takala, 
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Kotkansalo, Rahi, & Ikonen, 2014; Singer et al., 2009). While valuable information has 
been gleaned from these studies, there has been a dearth of focus on characteristics of OR 
nurses in relation to a culture of safety, such as the length of clinical experience and nurse 
engagement. Nurse engagement is defined as a state of mind that is fulfilled and satisfied, 
and it is characterized by commitment and immersion in one’s work (Schaufeli et al., 
2002). These variables and their association with safety are illustrated in Benner’s (1984) 
Novice to Expert model that explains how clinical experience leads to knowledge, 
engagement, and sound decision-making consistent with safety. Nurses who remain in 
their roles for longer periods have been touted to be more beneficial to their clinical 
environments than their less experienced peers because the knowledge and experience 
that is acquired over time is a key component in quality care and overall safety for 
patients (Benner, 1984; Riley, Dearmon, Mestas, & Buckner, 2016).  
Singer et al. (2009) suggested that there was a discrepancy between perceived 
culture of safety between healthcare personnel with varying lengths of clinical 
experience. Their study showed that those with less experience reported lower scores on 
culture of safety measures compared to their more experienced counterparts. The findings 
highlighted the differences of culture of safety reported by direct-care personnel versus 
their more senior counterparts in managerial roles. However, the researchers focused on 
healthcare personnel in general and were not specific about the role of nurses in the 
study.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that OR personnel were included in the study. 
These results were consistent with a study conducted in the in the United Kingdom 
examining the perceived culture of safety between experienced surgeons and novice 
surgeons. The findings showed that the perceived culture of safety was higher in the more 
 75 
 
experienced group, which led the researchers to accept that a culture of safety was 
positively related to the years of clinical experience of personnel. Due to the variance in 
safety culture perceptions between personnel with varying lengths of clinical experience, 
the researchers suggested that safety culture surveys should encompass personnel of 
varying clinical experience to attain a more valid clinical picture of perceived safety 
(Bethune, Canter, & Abrams, 2012).  
In addition, a 2014 literature review of safety in healthcare illustrated that junior 
employees’ lack of confidence based on insufficient experience was an impedance to 
speaking up for safety. The researchers concluded that physicians and nurses with limited 
clinical experience were reluctant to voice concerns over patient safety, even if they had 
awareness of the perils of such omissions (Okuyama, Wagner, & Bijnen, 2014). This is a 
specific facet of clinical experience that may affect adverse patient outcomes, particularly 
in the OR setting where patients are typically unable to speak for themselves.  
Similar to length of clinical experience, nurse engagement has also been linked to 
safety (Salanova, Lorens, Cifre, Martınez, & Schaufeli, 2003). Keyko (2014) stated that 
the concept of nurse engagement has been a topic of focus stimulated primarily by factors 
such as the rates of medical error and quality of patient care. For example, a 2005 Gallup 
poll found nurse engagement to be a significant predictor of patient safety in the U.S. 
Studies have shown that engaged personnel show an aptitude for learning and have 
characteristics associated with proactive and safe behavior (Salanova et al., 2003; 
Sonnentag, 2003; Wadsworth, Felton & Linus, 2016; Brooks Carton et al., 2019). These 
findings are consistent with the conclusion from Garcia-Sierra et al. (2016) who reported 
that nurse engagement affects how nurses perform, ultimately influencing patient 
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outcomes. Furthermore, in a qualitative study that explored the barriers to nurse 
engagement, nurses articulated that being in an environment that was unsafe for patients 
led to burnout, which has been described as the opposite of engagement. This study’s 
findings presented a positive relationship between nurse engagement and safe patient care 
(Freeney & Tiernan, 2009).  
While nurse engagement and length of clinical experience have been associated 
with safety in separate relationships, there is evidence that length of clinical experience 
and nurse engagement are closely aligned.  For example, employees who have high levels 
of engagement display favorable dispositions towards their roles and organizations with 
which they are employed, and therefore they tend to remain with their organizations for 
longer periods (Demerouti et al., 2001; Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). In addition, the 
positive relationship between all three factors; nurse experience, nurse engagement, and 
safety was demonstrated in a 2013 study asserting that engaged nursing teams were more 
willing to remain in their positions longer, and they reported better quality of patient care 
(Van Bogaert, Wouters, Willems, Mondelaers, & Clarke, 2013). Based on Benner’s 
(1984) theory as well as the extant literature, it was hypothesized that length of clinical 
experience and nurse engagement are strong predictors of culture of safety.  
Research Design and Methods 
The study applied a non-experimental, correlational design in which the strength 
and associations of the relationships between the length of the OR nurses’ clinical 




A power analysis demonstrated that the number of participants required to detect 
10% of the variance in culture of safety is 90.  Two types of sampling were employed. 
Purposeful sampling was applied to intentionally select nurses who currently work in an 
OR, and snowball sampling was applied in an effort to attain participants with various 
amounts of clinical experience that is consistent with the various stages of “novice to 
expert” as described by Benner (1984). Eligibility criteria included currently licensed 
registered nurses who worked primarily in an operating room setting for at least 20 hours 
per week, who were over the age of 18, and who were English-speaking.  
Recruitment 
Recruitment was conducted by email, verbal announcement, social media, and 
flyers. Eligible OR nurses were invited to participate by accessing an electronic link 
provided to them through each recruitment method.  A group email was sent to the 
members of the local Association of periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN) chapter to 
inform the OR nurses about the study. The email contained the study purpose, 
information on eligibility criteria, and a request for participants. Announcements were 
made at the meetings at which OR nurses attend monthly, and members of the local 
AORN chapter were asked to distribute the flyers containing information about the study 
to other OR nurses. Furthermore, a social media platform was used to advertise the study, 
its purpose, and call for eligible participants. The social media site included the web link 
to allow participants to access the data collection forms. The survey was available for two 




The study had three data collection tools: a demographic data collection form, the 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al. 2006), and the Utrecht Work 
Engagement Scale (UWES) (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006). 
The demographic data form collected data on the following: length of overall 
nursing clinical experience measured in years; length of clinical nursing experience 
specifically in the OR measured in years; age measured in years; level of nursing 
education, which included diploma, associate degree, baccalaureate degree, and graduate 
degree; status of OR nurse certification (Certified Nurse in the Operating Room [CNOR] 
yes:no); and number of ORs within the department in which the nurse is employed.  
The SAQ (Sexton et al., 2006) is a self-reported questionnaire developed to 
measure the safety attitudes of front-line workers. It is one of the most common tools to 
measure safety culture (Nguyen et al. 2015), and it has been used frequently to measure 
safety culture in the OR (Allard et al. 2011; Magill et al. 2017; Carvalho et al. 2015; 
Carney et al. 2010; St. Pierre, et al. 2017; Ongun & Intepeler, 2017). The SAQ elicits an 
illustration of the safety culture by surveying employees’ attitudes towards safety within 
their organization. It has been used to measure the culture of safety within organizations 
because the attitudes and creed of personnel related to safety reflects the culture of safety 
within the organization (Sexton et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2009). The instrument consists 
of seven dimensions that include teamwork climate, safety climate, job satisfaction, stress 
recognition, perceptions of hospital management, perceptions of unit management, and 
working conditions. The original instrument had 60 items (Sexton et al. 2006); however, 
it has been shortened to contain 41 items (Nguyen et al., 2015). Each item is answered 
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using a five-point Likert scale as follows: Disagree Strongly, Disagree Slightly, Neutral, 
Agree Slightly, and Agree Strongly. The shortened survey total SAQ scale Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.85, which showed good internal consistency, and the Cronbach’s alpha of 
each subscale ranged between 0.70 and 0.86 (Nguyen, et al. 2015).  
The UWES (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006) measured nurse engagement, 
which may be described as “a positive work-related state of fulfillment that is 
characterized by vigor, dedication, and absorption” (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 
2006). Initially, the scale had 24 items; however, it was shortened to a 9-item version by 
the scale authors. The scale has seven answer options that include Never, Almost Never, 
Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Very Often, and Always. The UWES has three dimensions 
including vigor, described as a high level of energy and mental resilience at work; 
dedication, described as a substantial involvement in one’s work that is accompanied by 
enthusiasm and a sense of significance; and absorption, described as full immersion in 
one’s work with difficulties detaching from it (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006). 
Cronbach’s alpha of the shortened UWES scales 0.92, which showed good internal 
consistency, and the Cronbach’s alpha of the three subscales ranged between 0.77 and 
0.85 (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006).  
Procedure 
IRB approval was obtained prior to the study. The quantitative tools, the 
demographic data collection form, the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2006) and the UWES 
(Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006), were used to collect data. Data were collected 
and managed using REDCap (Research Electronic Data Capture) electronic data capture 
tools hosted at the University of Louisville (Harris et al. 2009). REDCap is a secure, web-
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based application designed to support data capture for research studies, providing 1) an 
intuitive interface for validated data entry; 2) audit trails for tracking data manipulation 
and export procedures; 3) automated export procedures for seamless data downloads to 
common statistical packages; and 4) procedures for importing data from external sources.  
The REDCap link to connect to the surveys was available through social media 
for a period of two months. A copy of the link was on a group email that was sent to 
AORN members and on flyers provided to OR nurses. When participants clicked on the 
provided REDCap link, they were presented with the data collection platform that was 
preceded with a consent preamble. Following the consent preamble, the participants 
addressed the demographic data collection form followed by the UWES, and the SAQ 
surveys, which offered Likert scale answer options. The participants were given the 
opportunity to submit their answers at the conclusion of the final form. At the conclusion 
of data collection, the data from REDCap was exported into Excel and then uploaded into 
SPSS 25.0 (IBM Corp., 2017). 
Survey participants had the opportunity to voluntarily enter into a gift card 
drawing as a study incentive by providing their name and either a phone number or email 
address (unattached from the survey data) directly to the researcher. After the survey 
closed, three $50 gift cards were awarded by a drawing with the names of those who 
submitted their contact information. Entry into the drawing was not required to complete 
the survey.  
Data Management and Analysis  
Data were analyzed using SPSS Version 25.0 (IBM Corp, 2017). Descriptive 
analysis was conducted to describe the participants’ demographic data, including length 
 81 
 
of overall nurse experience, length of OR nurse experience, age, level of nursing 
education, number of ORs in department of employment, and OR nurse certification 
status. Frequencies, percentages, means, standard deviations, median, mode, and range 
were calculated, depending on the level of the data.  Using Cronbach’s alpha, the internal 
consistency of the SAQ was .958, and the internal consistency of the UWES was .904, 
which indicated strong internal consistency of both scales. The statistical significance for 
all analyses was based on the conventional level of significance of 0.05.  
The independent variables for the study included length of OR nurses’ clinical 
experience and OR nurse engagement, which were continuous variables. The dependent 
variable was culture of safety in the OR, which was also a continuous variable.  
The SAQ was answered using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Disagree 
Strongly” to 5 “Agree Strongly”.  An additional option 6 indicated  “not applicable.”  
Prior to analysis, all responses of 6 were explored and characterized as missing data 
because the value did not contribute to the true SAQ score. Missing data was managed by 
applying the “exclude cases pairwise” option in SPSS, which excluded the participant 
only if they were missing the data required for the specific analysis being conducted.  
Three of the items on the SAQ were reverse coded. No manipulation of coding 
was required for the UWES items. The sum scores for both the SAQ and for the UWES 
were calculated. The assumptions of the dependent variable, culture of safety, were 
evaluated. The assumption of normality was met as evidenced by non-statistically 
significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The assumption of homoscedasticity was assessed 
by examining a scatterplot. A VIF tolerance statistics was computed to assess 
multicollinearity between the length of clinical experience and nurse engagement, using 
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greater than or equal to five as a cutoff, with a result of  1.01, which did not indicate 
multicollinearity.  
For Aim 1, the following bivariate associations were examined: the length of the 
OR nurses’ experience and OR culture of safety (H1), length of the OR nurse 
engagement and OR culture of safety (H2), and length of the OR nurses’ experience and 
OR nurse engagement. For Aim 2, a standard multiple linear regression in which all of 
the variables were entered into the model simultaneously was conducted to examine the 
strength and association of the relationships between OR culture of safety, OR nurse 
engagement, and length of OR nurse clinical experience. For Aim 3, the adjusted R² was 
computed to determine the amount of variance in culture of safety attitudes that was 
explained by the model. Standardized beta coefficients were assessed to determine which 
variable, length of clinical experience or nurse engagement, appeared to be the strongest 
predictor of culture of safety. In addition, the interaction between the independent 
variables, length of OR clinical experience and OR nurse engagement was explored. For 
Aim 4, an independent sample t-test was conducted to assess if there were differences in 
culture of safety scores between those who had a certification in OR nursing (CNOR) 
versus those who had not.  
Results 
Demographic Characteristics 
The majority of participants (N = 96) had baccalaureate degrees (52.4%), and less than 
half (42.6%) had CNOR status (Table 7). The ages of the participants ranged from 21 to 
 70 years old with a mean age of 43.79 (SD=12.8). The length of OR nurse experience 
ranged from less than 1 year to 49 years, (M=3.82; SD=12.32) years, although the mean 
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the length of experience as a nurse in general was 18.61 (SD=13.05) years. The number 
of ORs within the departments of where the participants were employed ranged from 2 to 
25 (M=11.74; SD=6.17).  
Table 8 
   Descriptive Characteristics of Participants (N=96) 
                                                 
Characteristic M (SD)  
Age in years 43.79 (12.83)  
Length of experience as a nurse      18.61 (13.05)  
 
 
Length of experience in the OR 13.82 (12.32)  
   
 
Number of ORs-mean 11.74 (6.17)  
 Frequency (%)  
CNOR 
      Yes 






      Diploma 
      Associates degree 
      Baccalaureate degree 








Note. M=mean; SD=standard deviation 
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Overall, the mean culture of safety score (SAQ) was 155.23 (SD 30.42) (Table 8). 
Scores ranged from 65 to 198 with lower scores indicating a lower culture of safety. 
Scores for the UWES averaged 45.09 (SD 7.91) with a range of 21 to 63; lower scores 
represented lower engagement.  
 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for the SAQ and UWES 
                                                 
Variable N M (SD) Min-Max Possible 
Range 














         Note. M=mean; SD= standard deviation; Min-Max= minimum and maximum score values 
 
Relationships between length of the OR nurses’ clinical experience and culture of 
safety attitudes in the OR 
Bivariate associations between the length of OR nurse experience, OR nurse 
engagement, and OR safety culture using Pearson correlation technique indicated that 
although length of OR nurse experience was positively correlated with culture of safety 
in the OR, the relationship was weak and not statistically significant (r = .168; p=.189) 
(Table 9). Similarly, the length of OR nurse experience had a weak relationship with OR 
nurse engagement, and the relationship was not statistically significant (r=.105; p= .32). 
This is a contrast however to the relationship between OR nurse engagement and OR 
culture of safety in which the result of the Pearson correlation concluded that there was a 






Bivariate Associations between Culture of Safety, OR Nurse Work Engagement, and 
Length of OR Nurse Experience (N=93) 
 Culture of Safety in 
the OR 
OR Nurse Work 
Engagement 
Length of OR Nurse 
Experience 
Culture of Safety in 
the OR 
 
1.0 .628* .168 
OR Nurse Work 
Engagement 
 
.628* 1.00 .105 
Length of OR Nurse 
Experience 
.168 .105 1.00 
 
Predictors of OR culture of safety   
OR nurse engagement predicted culture of safety in the OR (p=<.001), while the 
length of OR nurse experience did not (p = >0.05). Out of the two independent variables, 
OR nurse engagement made the strongest unique contribution to predicting culture of 
safety in the OR (Table 10).  
Percent of variance in culture of safety explained by length of OR nurses’ clinical 
experience and OR nurse engagement 
Both independent variables, the length of OR nurse experience and OR nurse 
engagement, explained 38% (adjusted R2 =0.385) of the variance in OR culture of safety, 
and the amount of variance explained was statistically significant (p = <.001). OR nurse 
engagement was shown to predict OR culture of safety, such that as nurse engagement 
increased by one unit, the culture of safety increased by 2.37 units, while controlling for 
the length of nurse experience, and this association was statistically significant (p<.001). 
Table 11 
Associations between OR Culture of Safety, Length of OR Nurse Experience, and OR 














-.001 -.052 .542 
 
-.051 1.013 
OR Nurse  
Engagement 
 








Summary of Predictors of OR Culture of Safety (N=96) 
Variable β SE Beta t p 
Constant 44.64 17.76  2.51 0.02 
OR Nurse Engagement 2.37 1.00 0.62 6.11 <.001* 
Length of OR Nurse Experience 0.25 0.112 1.02 1.02 0.313 
*p<.05 
Differences in OR culture of safety based on CNOR 
Those with CNOR certification had a higher mean culture of safety score 
(M=166.43; SD 25.71) than those who did not hold a CNOR certification (M=145.06; SD 
31.16). This difference was statistically significant (t=2.97; df =61; p=.004).   
Discussion 
Achieving and sustaining a culture of safety in the OR is a topic of relevance 
because the OR is laden with risks due to its information-intensive, complex nature that , 
increases the vulnerability of OR patients. It is imperative, therefore, to examine factors 
associated with and predictive of a culture of safety in the OR. This study is the first to 
specifically examine OR nurse characteristics, such as OR nurse length of experience as 
well as OR nurse engagement and their associations with OR culture of safety.   
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The findings of the study demonstrated that OR nurse engagement has a strong 
association with and is a significant predictor of OR culture of safety. However, as this 
study used the sum scores of the UWES and the SAQ for analysis, further research is 
warranted to examine the relationships between the dimensions of each of the instruments 
to better understand relationships and associations between specific aspects of 
engagement and safety.  
The overall conclusion that nurse engagement is correlated with safety is 
consistent with the extant literature (Salanova et al., 2003; Sonnentag, 2003; Brooks 
Carthon, et al., 2019). However, previous studies linking nurse engagement with safety 
were not conducted with OR nurse participants, and none of the studies linking nurse 
engagement to safety applied the UWES as the instrument to measure nurse engagement.  
The length of OR nurse experience was also shown to be positively correlated 
with OR culture of safety. However, the relationship was weak and not statistically 
significant. This finding is generally inconsistent with previous studies that demonstrated 
strong positive associations between length of nurse experience and safety (Singer, et al., 
2009; Bethune, Canter, & Abrams, 2012; Riley, Dearmon, Mestas, & Buckner, 2016). In 
addtion, the findings related to the OR nurse length of experience are incongruent with 
Benner’s (1984) Novice to Expert theory, which suggests that as nurses gain experience 
in their roles, their ability to make sound, safe clinical decision-making is enhanced.  
Similarly, the relationship between OR nurse length of experience and OR nurse’s 
engagement was not statistically significant, which is an indication that length of clinical 
experience is not required to be engaged in one’s work. The findings led to a rejection of 
hypothesis 1 (There is a positive relationship between the length of the OR nurses’ 
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experience and OR culture of safety); hypothesis 2 (There is a positive relationship 
between the length of the OR nurses’ experience and OR nurse engagement), and 
hypothesis 4 (length of the OR nurses’ experience and nurse engagement predicts OR 
culture of safety). However, the study finding accepts hypothesis 2 (There is a positive 
relationship between OR nurse engagement and OR culture of safety).  
While the study results favored of OR nurse engagement over the length of OR 
nurse experience in relation to an OR culture of safety, managers should not assuage 
efforts to promote retention of their nurses, and arguably, the length of OR nurse 
experience is more likely beneficial when it is paired with OR nurse engagement.  
Furthermore, participants with CNOR certification demonstrated higher culture of 
safety scores than those without CNOR certification. However, the study did not 
determine if having CNOR certification was a predictor of OR culture of safety. 
Therefore, more research is warranted to examine the specific role CNOR certification 
plays in safety and engagement.  
Limitations 
As previously noted, the SAQ and the UWES each include multiple sub-scales. 
However, in this study, scores for the SAQ and for the UWES were summed and the sub-
scales were not addressed. Future research should explore relationships between the 
instruments sub-scales. A second limitation relates to the accessibility of the survey. 
Although every effort was made to recruit participants from a variety of geographic areas, 
data on participant’s location was not gathered. Therefore, it is unknown if the 
participants represented a wide geographic area or were primarily located in the 
Louisville, Kentucky bi-state region. Similarly, because of the use of social media 
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platform for recruitment, access to the survey was not restricted to US residents. 
Therefore, data generated from other countries could limit the generalizability of the 
findings to US hospitals specifically.  
With the ubiquitous nature of cell phones, it is possible that participants 
completed the surveys on their phones. This increases the challenge of visualizing the 
entire context of the study instruments on a relatively small screen. This may have 
hampered accuracy when answering questions with Likert-type responses, as with the 
UWES and SAQ instruments. It is possible that this factor played a role in the selection 
of the sixth response on the SAQ, which represented a “not applicable” answer, and it 
was not possible to determine if participants intended to choose the “not applicable” 
response or if participants intended to choose the “always” response, which was the fifth 
option. All responses consisting of 6 were subsequently assigned as “missing” data, to 
avoid artificially inflating the SAQ scores. This action reduced the sample size of the 
participants who completed the SAQ to 63. Finally, self-reported scales have limitations 
because they are subject to individual participant emotions and ability to interpret the 
questions. 
Conclusions 
The results illustrated that direct measures should be taken to increase OR nurse 
engagement so that a culture of safety can be fostered and sustained in the OR. 
Wadsworth, Felton, and Linus (2016) suggested that leadership personnel have a 
responsibility to engage their employees, and these authors provided concrete examples 
on how to engage nurses. Strategies to engage nurses included fortifying strategic plans 
that align nurses with their organization and involve direct-care nurses in shared-decision 
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making. They also suggested the “SOAR” (strengths, opportunities, aspirations, and 
results) model, which has been shown to effectively encourage innovation and nurture 
engagement of direct-care employees. In addition, Riley et al. (2016) reported that efforts 
such as applying a shared governance model was an effective strategy to engage and 
empower employees. Rather than attaining input only from managerial personnel, the 
inclusion of direct-care nurses in the overall organization mission can result in significant 
advancement and improvement in clinical quality and patient safety (Wadsworth et al., 
2016; Brooks Carthon et al., 2018). Furthermore, Demsey and Assi (2018) promulgated 
the crucial link that managerial staff have over the work environment and nurse 
engagement, which ultimately leads to higher patient safety standards and outcomes.  
While extant literature provides strategies to increase nurse engagement, there is 
little information on engaging OR nurses specifically. Therefore in light of the study 
findings and the unique nature of OR nurses, further research is warranted to explore 
specific strategies on engaging OR nurses. Furthermore, while this study focused on two 
specific OR nurse characteristics, studies examining other factors that may predict an OR 




SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation served to: (1) identify the primary safety concerns in the 
operating room (OR) from the perspective of practicing OR nurses; (2) explore the 
concept of normalization of deviance in the OR and identify perceived barriers and 
facilitators to adhering to safety standards; and, (3) investigate the strength and 
association of the relationships between the culture of safety in the OR, the length of the 
OR nurses’ clinical experience, and OR nurse engagement. This chapter synthesizes the 
research findings from both the qualitative and quantitative studies.  Finally, implications 
for further research, clinical practice, and policy are presented and discussed.  
  Synthesis 
A prolific interest in organizational culture of safety was generated in the 1990s, 
which was in part due to a culmination of well-publicized global disasters that occurred 
in the late 1980s, such as the National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA) 
Challenger explosion, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the 
London King’s Cross Underground fire (Pidgeon, 1998).  Pidgeon (1988) suggested that 
safety culture was a pertinent consideration within high-risk organizations because if 
safety culture is lacking, working conditions set the stage for system failures. The 
exploration of global disasters has led researchers to conclude that system failures arise 
from a significant period of inattention to detail and a normalization of deviance 
(Gerstein & Ellsberg, 2008; Pidgeon, 1998; Vaughan, 1996). 
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Vaughan (1996) explained that normalization of deviance is a concept whereby 
individuals and teams deviate from acceptable standards of conduct to the point where 
the deviation becomes the new norm. The concept is particularly pervasive when there is 
a period of absence from adverse events, which assuages the perception of risk. This is 
pertinent for safety culture research because etiolated attitudes towards safety violations 
in the workplace are antecedents to adverse events (Pidgeon, 1998; Rundmo, 1996; Price 
& Williams, 2018). Normalization of deviance can be particularly concerning in the OR, 
because it is a complex, information-intensive field in which patient safety is highly 
dependent on staff behavioral norms that are consistent with a culture of safety (Wright, 
2016; Link, 2019).  
A culture of safety is critical to thwart errors in the OR, and therefore, it is 
imperative to examine the factors that support a culture of safety and those that may 
attenuate it. The identification and acknowledgement of patient safety threats and 
antecedents to adverse events should continue to be a salient provocation in healthcare 
and play a role in guiding safety improvement strategies (Vincent, Carthey, Macrae, & 
Amalberti, 2017). Singer et al. (2009) concluded that a culture of safety within a 
healthcare facility was associated with higher levels of healthcare personnel safety-
related behaviors and better patient outcomes, which established a link between a 
healthcare organization’s culture of safety and patient safety. It is essential to investigate 
OR personnel practice and safety culture, which is increasingly being recognized as an 
important strategy and a necessary precursor to improving the widespread deficits in 
patient safety (Pronovost & Sexton, 2005; Vincent, et al., 2017).  
Examining safety, however, is not unidimensional. While social sciences have 
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typically measured culture of safety by examining individual attitudes towards safety, 
other sciences, such as engineering, have traditionally assessed safety with a focus on the 
examination of systems (Pidgeon, 1998). Vincent et al. (2017) reported that organizations 
have historically leaned towards incident reports and investigative efforts to assess safety; 
however, adding assessments that include the anticipation of safety risk in the future is 
becoming widely accepted (Vincent, et al., 2017).  Therefore, it was appropriate to 
combine more than one approach to exploring OR safety, whereby specific safety 
practices are explored within the tapestry of safety culture so that risk can be identified 
and mitigated before adverse events occur.   
This mixed-methods study, whereby the qualitative component is referred to as 
Phase 1 and the quantitative component is referred to as Phase 2, presented a unique 
approach to examining safety culture in the OR. Safety practices and normalization of 
deviance in the OR were explored qualitatively as well as quantitatively by examining 
OR safety culture and factors that may affect it. Such factors include length of OR nurse 
experience and OR nurse engagement.  
Methods  
The mixed methods study used an exploratory sequential design in three-phases.  
Phase 1 included the collection of qualitative data, Phase 2 included the collection of 
quantitative data, and Phase 3 included interpretation of data from the prior phases 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). The exploratory sequential design is illustrated in Figure 
3. 
Phase 1 applied a focused ethnographic approach, which may be defined as a 
subsidiary of traditional ethnography whereby particular elements of a culture are 
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examined against the background of a larger culture (Wolf, 2010). This approach was 
appropriate to use for this study because safety behaviors and normalization of deviance 
were explored in OR nurses, who are a subculture of nurses at large.   
Phase 2 applied a non-experimental, correlational design in which the strength 
and associations of the relationships between OR culture of safety, the length of OR 
nurses’ experience, and OR nurse engagement were investigated. The final phase 
involved the summarization and interpretation of both qualitative and quantitative results 







Results for Phase 1 
Aim 1) OR nurses reported areas of primary safety concerns as follows: There 
were two primary themes identified including productivity pressures and inadequate staff 
to support workload. Additional concerns that were reported included “infobesity;” 
inconsistency of order entry, and general complacency of staff. Aim 2) Specific examples 
of normalization of deviance in the OR were illustrated, for example, participants 
indicated that OR nurses acquire a general complacency in relation to the adherence of 
safety standards, particularly when there is a perceived absence of adverse events. Aim 3) 
Themes relating to the barriers to adhering to safety standards and reasons for 
normalization of deviance included: productivity pressures, generalized complacency, 
complacency related to length of experience, social pressures, and negative acculturation.  
An additional reason included disconnection from direct consequences; however, this 
was not categorized as a theme because there was only one supporting quote.    
Facilitators to adhering to safety standards and protective factors against 
normalization of deviance included nurse engagement and supportive managerial 
relationships with OR nurses. Nine out of ten participants indicated that nurse 
engagement supported the adherence to safety standards. Engagement was also 
associated with confidence and empowerment, and nurses alluded that clinical experience 
was not a precursor for engagement. In addition, three out of ten participants reported that 
their relationship with managerial personnel was supportive. Participants inferred that a 
supportive relationship with management led to open communication and a safer 
environment because managers understood the challenges in the OR and supported OR 
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nurses’ work. In addition, participants indicated that supportive managerial relationships 
contributed to OR nurse engagement.   
Results for Phase 2 
The results for Phase 2 demonstrated that the length of OR nurse experience was 
positively correlated with culture of safety in the OR; however, the relationship was 
weak, and it was not statistically significant. In contrast, OR nurse engagement had a 
statistically significant relationship with culture of safety, and it was a significant 
predictor of OR culture of safety. Finally, certified OR nurses had significantly higher 
culture of safety scores compared with those without certification.   
Integration of the Results from both Phase 1 and Phase 2 
Data integration is central to mixed methods analysis. The integration of the 
 Phase 1 and Phase 2 findings involved the summarization and interpretation of both 
qualitative and quantitative results focusing on how qualitative results may be tested and 
how quantitative results may be generalized (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2018).  
OR safety concerns, normalization of deviance in the OR, and perceived barriers 
and facilitators to adhering to safety standards were uncovered and categorized. Reported 
barriers were heavily associated with an insensitivity to the importance of safety-related 
protocols and a normalization of deviance. While barriers and facilitators to the 
adherence to safety protocols were uncovered, there was a specific focus on the length of 
OR nurse experience and OR nurse engagement.  
Phase 1 results, particularly from the perspective of OR nurse engagement and the 
length of OR nurse experience, informed Phase 2. The specific focus on OR nurse 
engagement and the length of OR nurse experience is key to the integration of Phase 1 
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and Phase 2 because OR nurse participants from Phase 1 reported that the length of OR 
nurse experience was often associated with a lax attitude toward safety, whereas it was 
reflected that OR nurse engagement was associated with sound clinical decision making 
ability that was consistent with patient safety. Although a pilot qualitative study that was 
conducted one year earlier did not include specific questions on length of experience or 
nurse engagement, these factors also emerged from the pilot study findings as influencers 
over safety practices.  
Phase 1 findings corroborated those of Phase 2, which inferred that the 
relationship between the length of OR nurse experience and OR culture of safety was 
weak and not statistically significant. In contrast, OR nurse engagement had a positive, 
statistically significant relationship with culture of safety in the OR. Table 12 illustrates 
the joint display of the integration of the results from both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of this 
mixed-methods study. 
Table 13 




























OR nurses suggested that 
engagement was a characteristic 
that protected nurses against 
normalization deviance and 
provided them with the ability to 
withstand pressures to deviate 
from the meticulous safety 
standards required to ensure 
safety for OR patients. 
Quantitative results supported this 
finding by demonstrating a 
statistically significant 
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engagement and OR culture of 
safety.  Also, Phase 2 results 
indicated that OR nurse 
engagement was a statistically 
significant predictor of OR 
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Most OR nurse participants 
indicated that length of OR nurse 
experience was a reason for 
normalization deviance because 
nurses can become lax and 
complacent over time and 
unwilling to change behavior 
based on updated policies and 
procedures. Also, the length of 
OR nurse experience was not 
significantly correlated with OR 
culture of safety, nor was it a 
significant predictor of OR 




This study is the first to explore normalization of deviance in the OR, and while 
abundant information was gleaned, the OR remains a fertile environment for further 
research that explores safety practices as well as additional factors that support or 
attenuate a culture of safety. In light of the prominent theme of productivity pressure both 
as a safety concern and as a prevailing reason for normalization of deviance, more 
research is needed on the impact of productivity pressure on the quality of care in the OR.  
While efficiencies and effective time management strategies are warranted for 
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fiscal responsibility, particularly in light of the revenue-generating position that most 
ORs hold in their facilities, the extent that excessive productivity pressure is placed on 
direct-care OR nurses is harmful and detrimental to patient safety. There is an abundance 
of literature relating to OR efficiencies with fiscal motives embedded (Fong, Smith, & 
Langerman, 2016; Rothstein & Raval, 2018); however, there is a dearth of information on 
the non-monetary price that the quest for excessive efficiencies exacts. Therefore, 
strategies to improve efficiencies without hampering OR quality of care should be 
examined and highlighted.  
While rich data related to the reasons for normalization of deviance were gathered 
from Phase 1, it is clear that that more research should be done to explore additional 
reasons. For example, one participant said “We don’t ever see any positioning injury 
[data]. None of that is brought to our attention, like when we have monthly meetings, 
none of that is shared with staff at all.” This quote was stated in reference to OR nurses 
being lulled in to a sense of complacency because of a lack of awareness of OR adverse 
events. While the quote refers specifically to positioning injury, the same concept applies 
to other adverse events that can occur in the OR without knowledge of such at the time of 
its occurrence, such as surgical site infection, and the retainment of foreign objects. The 
OR nurse participant suggested that it would be safer to have transparent conversations 
between management and direct-care nurses in relation to adverse events. This concept 
should be explored further because the lack of awareness or knowledge of adverse events 
can assuage the perception of risk and contribute to normalization of deviance. Research 
on potential barriers to the open discussion of such events, for example, litigious issues or 
fear of facility defamation, should be explored.   
 100 
 
A prominent finding from both phases includes the salience of OR nurse 
engagement to support safety practices and the sustenance of an OR safety culture. 
Therefore, strategies for increasing OR nurse engagement should be explored and tested. 
In addition, areas for future research include examining the relationships between the 
specific dimensions of the SAQ and UWES scales, which could offer an insight into the 
associations between OR nurse engagement and OR culture of safety. For instance, two 
of the dimensions of the SAQ include, perceptions of hospital management and 
perceptions of unit management; therefore the examination of these dimensions 
specifically in relation to predictors, such as engagement or other nurse characteristics 
may offer more knowledge on how management plays a role in safety.  
Synthesis of Phase 1 and 2 study results indicated that the length of OR nurse 
experience can be a barrier to the adherence to safety standards and is not related to an 
OR culture of safety. However, this finding is inconsistent with the findings of other 
studies that reflected that length of nurses’ experience was related to patient safety 
(Benner, 1984; Singer, et al., 2009; Bethune, Canter, & Abrams, 2012; Riley, Dearmon, 
Mestas, & Buckner, 2016). While previous studies examining the realtionship between 
length of experience and patient saftey were not based on OR nurses, further research on 
the value of length of nurse experience within various practice settings may be warranted. 
In addition, the discrepancy of study findings in relation to length of experience may 
point to an inherent difference in OR nurses compared to nurses within other clinical 
practice subspecialties, which opens an opportunity for further research.   
Finally, Phase 2’s findings showed that OR nurses who have CNOR certification 
had significantly higher OR culture of safety scores compared with their non-certified 
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peers; however, it is unclear if certification is predictive of an OR safety culture. Thus 
research is warranted to examine the specific role CNOR certification plays in OR safety.  
Practice Implications 
The exclusive focus on OR nurses in the study bears much relevance to OR 
clinical practice because of the unique, prominent, and multi-faceted roles that they 
assume. For example, the responsibilities of the OR nurse include, but are not limited to: 
preparing the operating room with supplies and equipment for the intended surgery, 
interviewing and assessing the surgical patient prior to surgery, supporting the anesthesia 
provider with the administration of anesthesia and placement of endotracheal tube, 
assisting with the positioning of the patient, performing the surgical skin preparation, 
ensuring functioning equipment, overseeing the surgery to ensure safety is maintained, 
helping the scrub personnel, and, caring for the patient in the immediate postoperative 
period. Therefore, while there are many roles within the surgical team, the OR nurse is 
the only team member who manages the many different facets of care over the entire 
perioperative period. Each task that is required of OR nurses carries risk, and if the tasks 
are performed without adhering wholly to safety standards, the vulnerability for surgical 
patients increases exponentially.  
The findings of Phase 1 illustrated a pervasiveness of normalization of deviance, 
and therefore, it is imperative to acknowledge and disseminate these findings to OR 
personnel and management so that the reasons for such as be assuaged. The primary 
reasons for normalization of deviance included: productivity pressure, generalized 
complacency, complacency related to length of experience, social pressures, and negative 
acculturation. Each of these reasons need to be addressed openly and in detail so that 
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these barriers to adhering to safety standards can be mitigated to foster a culture of OR 
safety. 
The responsibility for providing safety to surgical patients lies with all 
perioperative team members, nurse educators, managers, and administrators. Patient 
safety needs to be at the forefront of all discussions related to practice and policy. An 
open, transparent culture should exist so that OR nurses do not encounter barriers to the 
adherence to safety standards in the workplace without being supported by managerial 
personnel.  
It is crucial that a culture of safety in the OR is created, fostered, and sustained. 
OR nurses should be given enough support and resources to meet the complex demands 
of the role as well as to effectively balance productivity, efficiency and safety. 
Complacency towards safety standards should be reported in a non-punitive manner. In 
addition, an awareness of the high-risk nature of the OR should be promoted frequently 
so that complacency is seen as an outlier more than the norm. Social pressures related to 
incivility that may exist in the workplace need to be rooted out by providing opportunities 
to report incivility without fear of retribution. In addition, encouragement of team 
members to support each other as safety practices are conducted is essential. Negative 
acculturation should be managed with help from nurse educators who can formally 
outline orientation practices to help standardize orientation of new OR nurses. The 
adherence to safety standards should be modeled by preceptors so that safety practice 
deviations that can reinforce unsafe practices in preceptees are deemed unacceptable.   
As OR nurse engagement emerged as a facilitator to the adherence to safety 
standards, and well as its demonstration of being a significant predictor of an OR safety 
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culture, implementing strategies to increase OR nurse engagement gains prime 
importance. In addition, supportive managerial relationships also emerged as a facilitator 
to adherence to safety practices. Furthermore, Phase 1 participants indicated that 
supportive managerial relationships facilitated safety standards adherence, and they 
inferred that supportive relationships increased nurse engagement. The link between 
managerial support and safety and engagement is supported in the literature (Demsey & 
Assi, 2018; Price & Williams, 2018; Harvey & Sotardi, 2017; Wadsworth, Felton, and 
Linus, 2016). Therefore, relationships between OR nurses and managerial personnel need 
to be fortified and energized with respect, understanding, and other managerial behaviors 
fostering a supportive workplace, which nurtures a safe work environment and 
accommodates nurse engagement (Dempsey & Assi, 2018).  
There are additional benefits to involving OR leaders in the management of 
safety. For example, Price and Williams (2018) concluded that leadership involvement 
had a pertinent role in patient safety. In addition, while the mixed methods study focused 
solely on direct-care OR nurses, it is imperative to avoid allocating blame and criticism to 
any one person or group because opportunities to improve safety standards lie beyond 
those who provide direct care in the OR. Thus, there needs to be a shift in focus from 
individual guilt to overall systems and processes (Price & Williams, 2018). 
Policy Implications 
Policies should be implemented that fortify a system of adverse events and near-
miss reporeting within the OR. While there is documented evidence that adverse events 
occur in the OR (Steelman, Shaw, Shine, & Hardy-Fairbanks, 2019), the reporting of 
such is ambiguous and poorly understood. This is primarily due to challenges with the 
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reporting of data due to lack of transparency and the lack of standardized national 
reporting systems and definitions (Thiels et al., 2015). Specifically, prospectively 
collected data on the incidence of surgical never events are limited, and many studies 
involve voluntary reporting to external agencies with innate bias (Austin & Pronovost, 
2015; Theils et al. 2015). This is problematic because the lack of comprehensive data 
may not accurately present the reality of flawed safety systems. Therefore, greater 
attention needs to be given to standardized reporting systems relating to OR adverse 
events, near-misses, and general OR safety standard deviation in a non-punitive and 
supportive environment (Harvey & Sotardi, 2017). Policies related to the fortification of 
reporting systems should promote transparency and the acknowledgement of near-misses 
and deviations so that risk can be attenuated before deviations from safety standards 
become entrenched and normalized in personnel’s practice behavior.  
In addition, policies should be implemented to ensure that that there is a shared-
governance approach within hospital facilities. This model would help establish an 
inclusion of direct-care OR nurses in decision-making related to OR practices, which is a 
strategy that would promote engagement in OR nurses (Harvey & Sotardi, 2017; Brook 
Carthon et al., 2019).  Furthermore, Harvey and Sotardi (2018) suggested that when 
managers attain feedback from direct-care employees, an effective conduit is created to 
better understand challenges, such as productivity pressures, that may exist in the direct-
care environment. In this way, a more transparent, safer culture can be enhanced.    
Summary  
Achieving and sustaining a culture of safety in the OR is worthy of significant 
attention because the environment is laden with risk due its information-intensive, 
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complex nature, which increases vulnerability for OR patients. It is imperative, therefore, 
to examine the safety concerns of OR nurses, uncover practices consistent with 
normalization of deviance, identify barriers and facilitators to adhering to OR safety 
protocols as well as examine the relationships of factors associated with the culture of 
safety within the OR.    
Normalization of deviance is embedded within the OR culture but it has not 
widely acknowledged because of its stealth nature. Considering the mixed-methods study 
findings, it is essential to highlight the pervasive nature of this phenomenon within ORs. 
Efforts should be made to disseminate the findings so that a platform of open-
conversation and transparency between OR nurses and their managerial counterparts can 
be formed. Acknowledging barriers to safety practices, providing opportunities for the 
involvement of OR nurses in decision-making related to OR processes as well as openly 
discussing needed resources for safe and efficient practice may foster a culture of safety 
in the OR. 
Finally, OR nurse engagement and supportive managerial relationships with OR 
nurses were identified as facilitators that guide OR nurses to practice safely as well as 
contribute to an overall culture of safety. Therefore, it is imperative to promote OR nurse 
engagement and supportive managerial relationships with OR nurses as strategies to 
improve the adherence to safety standards and mitigate risk for vulnerable surgical 
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